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Foreword 
 
Foreword to the Corruption in Slovakia Survey 
 
 
 Dear citizens, 
 
The Slovak Government requested the World Bank to conduct a diagnostic study on corruption in 
the Slovak Republic as part of the “National Program for the Fight Against Corruption“. This 
study, financed by USAID, was carried out in collaboration with  Slovak governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions. 
 
Corruption is a phenomenon as old as mankind and, undoubtedly, can never be conquered 
completely. However, this does not mean we should be unconcerned. Corruption involves 
enormous direct and indirect costs and damages. These costs are evident not only in the 
economical sector, but have negative consequences on all aspects of life within the whole society 
as well. Various analyses and surveys testify that corruption is particularly wide-spread in 
postcommunist countries. This is the experience of the people living there as well.  The 
communist heritage – mainly in the distortion of  values and institutions –encourages the 
expansion of corruption during the period of transition. Unfortunately, Slovakia is no exception in 
this aspect. Besides the distortions of communism, we were most of all confronted by the 
distortions from the Mečiar-period. From the point of view of corruption, this period brought “a 
new quality“ that tends to survive even after the defeat of “mečiarism“  in the 1998 elections. 
 
Nowadays, much is spoken about globalization and its influence on economic development and 
prosperity, as well as intensifying discrepancies in the economical and social sectors. There is no 
unanimous agreement in every aspect, but one thing is certain. Transparency and minimizing 
corruption are, and will be, more and more important premises for the competition of enterprises, 
corporations, and even states.  A transparent and effective public administration reduces the 
possibilities for corruption to occur. In Slovakia, there is much room for improvement of the 
govermental and public administration in this aspect. 
 
The dismal state of corruption in Slovakia (as supported by the data from this present study) 
dictates that the active fight against corruption must remain a crucial priority for the Government. 
The “National Program for the Fight Against Corruption“ and the preparation of this survey, 
together with its release to the public, are but the first steps. I am convinced that these are steps in 
the right direction. However, it is only a beginning of a long and difficult path, which can come to 
a successful end if there is a clear political will to fight this social and economical malady, and if 
the national program for the fight becomes a really nationwide effort. 
 
 
 
Bratislava, July 3, 2000 
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Executive Summary 
1. Overview 
Following elections in late 1998, the new coalition Government of the Slovak Republic recognized the 
harmful effects of corruption and placed anticorruption high on the official agenda.  A key milestone was 
reached in late 1999 when first draft of the National Program for the Fight Against Corruption was 
prepared.  The openness demonstrated by including non-governmental bodies as active participants in 
developing a strategy – Transparency International Slovakia was instrumental in drafting the National 
Program – is congruent with the openness of public administration that will help fight corruption.  The 
National Program seeks “to combat corruption in Slovakia, especially in public life and in the use of public 
funds and resources.”  The National Program itself provides the framework that the effort to fight 
corruption will take – an Action Plan, due out in mid-2000, will contain specific commitments, assign 
specific responsibilities, and outline a timetable for completion.  
Recognition of the devastation corruption wreaks on economic development has led some major donors to 
move anticorruption to positions of prominence on their development agendas.  In 1996 James 
Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, extended an open offer to help member countries with the 
struggle against corruption, and many have formally requested assistance.  Similarly, the United State 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has long been a leader in the battle against corruption by 
promoting transparency, establishing checks and balances, and strengthening the rule of law.  Slovakia is 
one of a growing number of countries have sought to tackle the problem of corruption, requesting that these 
institutions conduct a diagnostic study of corruption in Slovakia. 
For this study, the survey research firm “Focus” was selected in a tender to administer questionnaires on 
perceptions and experiences with corruption to three distinct groups: households, enterprise managers, and 
public officials.  Each of the samples was designed to be national in scope, with respondents drawn from all 
eight of the regions of Slovakia.  Over 350 public officials, 400 enterprise managers, and 1,100 ordinary 
people participated in the study. 
The surveys reveal that corruption is common and affects all key sectors of the economy.  Individual 
citizens were most affected in the social sectors, with 60 percent indicating payment of pozornost1 (some of 
which were expressions of gratitude, but most of which were non-voluntary) to obtain hospital services and 
between a quarter and a third for other medical services and higher education. Enterprises are most affected 
by licensing and regulatory bodies, courts and customs, with incidences of bribes reported by one-third for 
a number of these offices. Many firms reported that they unofficially sponsor political parties. All three 
groups of respondents identified the judicial system as a major area of corruption, with enterprises 
reporting frequent bribes in court cases and citing slow courts and low execution of justice as the most 
important obstacles to doing business.  Moreover, households report paying frequent bribes to court 
personnel, especially to speed up the process,  and those who found experiences with courts to be 
inefficient and slow were much more likely to report that the process was corrupt. 
The public officials survey demonstrates that corruption is closely related to the quality of the institutions 
of public administration.  The bodies with the lowest levels of corruption were those in which the lines of 
internal communications were clear, administrative rules were well-implemented, personnel decisions were 
based on merit rather than connections or corruption, and the organization’s mission was widely understood 
by staff.  The level of meritocracy is particularly strong for explaining levels of corruption.  The surveys 
also make clear that while most public officials at all levels of government support public sector reforms, 
they are relatively more concerned about the practical implementation of the reforms. 
 
                                                          
1 Gifts, tips and bribes.  See the main text for discussion. 
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2. Levels and Trends of Corruption in Slovakia 
How bad is corruption in Slovakia?  The survey results show that unofficial payments to government 
officials are common, that these payments are viewed by the public as “corruption”, and that corruption is 
hindering the public sector’s delivery of quality services to the citizenry.  Roughly one out of seven 
households and one out of six enterprises reported having made unofficial payments in the previous two 
months; in the three years before the surveys, more than 40 percent of households and enterprises made 
unofficial payments.  The public officials confirm the ubiquity of the practice.  Over 40 percent said they 
had been offered small gifts in the previous two years, and 10 percent said they had been offered cash or an 
expensive present. 
Summary Indicators of Experiences with Corruption 
  
Households  Percent making unofficial payments in previous two months 14.4
 Percent making unofficial payments in previous three years 41.3
  
Enterprises  Percent making unofficial payments in the previous two months 17.6
 Percent making unofficial payments in the previous three years 41.4
  
Public Officials Percent offered a small gift in the previous two years 42.3
 Percent offered money or an expensive gift in the previous two years 9.7
  
 
While most bribes revealed by survey respondents were small, some were quite large: one respondent 
reported paying 100,000 SK2 for a hospital stay, and some enterprises reported paying up to 100,000 SK 
for certain types of licenses.  As a share of revenues, bribe payments can also be large.  On average, 
enterprises reported that firms like theirs pay more than two percent of revenues in bribes.  Resources that 
could otherwise be used for investment and training are instead transferred to the subset of officials who 
abuse their positions.  The net cost that corruption imposes on firms can also be measured by whether or 
not they would be willing to pay additional taxes to eliminate corruption.  Despite the fact that high tax 
rates are viewed as a problem for business development, one in four enterprises expressed a willingness to 
pay additional taxes if doing so would eliminate corruption – of those that had paid bribes recently, one in 
three were willing.  Those willing to pay additional taxes to eliminate corruption responded, on average, 
that they would be willing to pay 7.6 percent more in taxes, spotlighting the implicit tax that corruption 
places on these firms. 
When was corruption the highest in Slovakia? 
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Is Corruption Getting Worse?  For Slovakia, three sets of survey questions allow some insights into the 
trends.  First, the questionnaires implemented in Slovakia included a question very similar to one that had 
 vii
                                                          
2 The approximate exchange rate is 40 SK = 1 USD. 
been asked in sociological studies in Czechoslovakia (1989), and the Czech Republic (1998).3  Comparing 
the results confirms what many have suspected:  from the perspective of the general public, the levels of 
bribery are much worse now than ten years ago.  Second, we asked all three survey groups in Slovakia 
when they thought corruption was the worst.  In the opinion of the general population, nearly equal 
numbers reported that corruption was the worst in the period 1994-1998, as it has been since 1998.  
Enterprise managers and public officials, however, more strongly reported that corruption was worse 
during 1994-1998.  It is also clear that many Slovaks believe that corruption has been virtually unchanged, 
with a roughly a third of respondents reporting that corruption was the same in all three sample periods. 
Third, we asked public officials to evaluate how common “unofficial payments” are at their organizations, 
both now and two years earlier.  Although the change is very slight, on average, public officials reported 
that bribery in their organizations was more widespread two years earlier. 
While the surveys suggest that 
there may have been some 
improvement in the levels of 
corruption relative to a few 
years ago, the message that 
comes through much more 
forcefully is that most believe 
that corruption levels have not 
changed – corruption remains a 
formidable challenge that must 
be addressed. 
Perceptions of Corruption 
Which Governmental Bodies 
are Reported to be the Most 
Corrupt?   The questionnaires 
of households, enterprises, and 
public officials collected 
information about both 
perceptions and experiences 
with corruption.  The data 
suggest broad agreement 
between all three sample groups 
that corruption is widespread in 
the health system, the justice 
system, customs, the National 
Property Fund, and the police.  
While household respondents 
generally perceive the levels of 
corruption to be somewhat 
higher than enterprise managers 
and public officials, the 
responses of public officials 
and enterprise managers also 
suggest the perception of 
widespread corruption – half of 
all public officials surveyed 
reported that corruption is “very 
widespread” in the health 
sector, and half of enterprise 
managers said the same of the 
justice system. 
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3 See the main text for sources.  
 
In the enterprise survey, managers were asked how many times they had visited each of 26 different bodies, 
most of them state agencies but including state-owned utilities, banks and notaries, as well.  Respondents 
were also asked on how many visits it was made known to them that they should pay a bribe or that they 
felt before-hand that they must pay a bribe.  Topping the list are customs, import and export licensing, the 
Certification Authority, construction permits, and State Business Supervision.  Not far behind were other 
licenses, telecommunications, and the courts.  
In the household survey, 
respondents were asked about their 
most recent experiences (within the 
past two years) with the health 
system, educational institutions, and 
the police (criminal investigations), 
and about important experiences 
with several other bodies such as 
the cadastre, the labor office, 
savings banks, etc. Hospitals top 
this list, with nearly 60 percent of 
respondents reporting that they 
provided some pozornost when a 
household member was in the 
hospital.  (Even after dropping 
cases where the pozornost was 
completely voluntary, households 
were more likely to make unofficial 
payments at hospital visits than for 
any of the other state bodies and 
agencies.)  Medical specialists, the 
judiciary, the traffic police and 
universities were also indicated as 
frequent bribe recipients. 
Percent of Enterprises that Encountered Bribery in 
Previous Two Years 
(of those that interacted with the body or service) 
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The experiences reported in the 
survey parallel the perception that 
corruption is widespread in the 
health sector, the judiciary, and the 
police.4  Similarly, the perception 
that corruption is less widespread in 
the labor office is supported by the 
fact that only a small percentage of 
households that contacted the labor 
office paid a bribe. 
Who Encounters Corruption 
Most Often?  An understanding of the incidence of corruption provides insight into the way corruption 
works and how it is affecting the economy and society.  In some ways, one can not pinpoint who is most 
affected since corruption affects everyone.  Certain well-known effects of corruption – the erosion of 
credibility in the institutions of state and weakening of the business environment – clearly have an impact 
on everyone, regardless of whether or not they have personally encountered corruption.  If state resources 
are inappropriately diverted or wasted through corrupt procurements, society loses the resources and ends 
up with sub-standard facilities or equipment.  If bribes are paid to evade health regulations or obtain 
construction permits, society may suffer an unnecessary threat to their health and safety.  If a perception of 
 ix
                                                          
4 Experiences with the police vary greatly.  While the traffic police are frequent recipients of bribes, far fewer bribes 
were reported for criminal investigations, and provision of ID cards, passports, and driving licenses. 
corruption causes the public to view court rulings as biased, people may settle disputes in ways outside of 
the scope of the law. 
Enterprise Characteristics: 
 Firms in Bratislava were the most likely to have made unofficial payments, and firms in Trencín were 
the least likely.  
 Firms in construction, industry, and agriculture and forestry were slightly more likely than firms in 
other sectors to have paid bribes.   
 Medium and large firms are somewhat more likely to have paid bribes than smaller firms: 15 percent 
of small firms had paid a bribe in the previous two months, compared to 22 percent of medium and 
large firms. 
 Firms that are members of business associations were much more likely to have paid bribes than firms 
that are not members in the two months before the survey (24 percent versus 15 percent), and in the 
three years before the survey (57 percent versus 35 percent).  The statistical importance of membership 
in business association becomes even stronger when controlling for all other enterprise characteristics. 
 Firms that grew faster in the three years prior to the survey were more likely than slower growing 
enterprises to have made unofficial payments in those same three years.  This “growth effect” is 
mirrored for investment.  Firms that had made major investments were more likely to have bribed, and 
those that were planning major investments were also more likely to have bribed.  However, the data 
shows that unofficial payments are not useful for growth or investment.  The results simply reflect the 
fact that growing firms have more interactions with state bodies and agencies, getting more licenses 
and permits, facing more inspections, and so forth, than do firms that are not growing. 
Household Characteristics: 
 Respondents with driver’s licenses are more likely to have made unofficial payments, consistent with 
the finding that payments to traffic police are common.   
 Older respondents are more likely to have made unofficial payments than younger respondents, and 
female respondents were more likely to have made unofficial payments than male respondents.   
 Those with higher levels of education are more likely to have made unofficial payments than those 
with lower levels of education, although this seems to be generated by the fact that those with higher 
levels of education generally have higher income, are likely to be drivers, and have more contact with 
public officials. 
 While the household survey data show clearly that wealthier households are more likely to have made 
unofficial payments, the data also show that the impact on poorer households is greater. While the 
median visit to a general practitioner represented 1 percent of household income, the poorest third of 
the population paid an average of 3.6 percent of an already small monthly income for a single visit to 
the doctor. 
 
3. Experiences with Corruption 
Health Care:  Health care is the state sector that touches the largest portion of the population – over 80 
percent of the households in the survey had visited a medical facility in the previous two years.  The health 
sector is also one perceived to have widespread corruption.  The household survey confirms that pozornost 
is frequently paid in health care.  While many payments are small expressions of gratitude, many were also 
characterized as being necessary to receive proper care. 
 x
 Respondents were generally satisfied with their visits to health care institutions.  People were least 
satisfied with length of waiting time – those who visited hospitals were least satisfied with the 
facilities. 
 By far, the type of service for which pozornost is paid most often is for hospital stays.  Nearly six out 
of ten respondents who stayed in the hospital paid, and most of them said it was not just a voluntary 
expression of gratitude.   
 Four of ten respondents who visited the hospital left some gift, and one in five who visited a specialist 
left some gift.  Three in ten respondents who visited the hospital paid pozornost in the form of cash. 
 Forty-three percent of those who paid pozornost said that “nobody required it – just wanted to give it”, 
52 percent said that “nobody required it, but this is just the way it goes”, and 5 percent said it was 
“required by the medical workers”.  Hospitals, by far the type of facility at which respondent were 
most likely to have paid, were also the facilities for which the attention was least likely to be voluntary.  
 The size of pozornost paid in the health sector ranges from 20 SK to 100,000 SK for a stay in the 
hospital. 
 Most who paid pozornost said that they paid the attention to improve quality (35 percent) or to express 
thankfulness (33 percent).  Other paid pozornost to get better prescription drugs, to avoid a long wait, 
and simply because “everyone does it.” 
 When developing an anticorruption strategy for the health sector, it will be important to address the 
entire system, beginning with the medical universities.  As discussed below, bribes seem to be 
routinely paid for admittance to medical school, a practice which sets a bad tone for those entering the 
medical profession.  
Education:  Like the health sector, the education sector touches nearly every Slovak at some point. Over 
forty percent of the households that responded to the survey had at least one member in primary, secondary, 
or vocational schools or universities.  Nearly all of the students (95 percent) attended state-run institutions, 
with the remainder attending church- or private-run institutions. 
 On average, households with students reported being somewhat satisfied with the quality of teachers 
and educators, and there is little difference between the responses for the different levels of schooling.   
 For every eight students enrolled in an educational institution in the previous term, one reported paying 
some pozornost.  Twenty-two percent of households with university students paid some attention, 
while only 10-12 percent at other levels paid pozornost.  
 Less than 2 percent of respondents at the university level reported there “was and is no bribery at all”, 
less than 2 percent reported a decrease in bribery, and 82 percent reported that bribery had increased.  
(Half said bribery had increased immensely.) 
 For lower levels of schooling, the most prevalent form of pozornost came in the form of gifts.  At the 
university level, cash payments were made more frequently than gifts. 
 Roughly one out of five households that paid pozornost reported that it was required by the school 
workers, while nearly half reported giving the attention freely; the remaining 30 percent reported that 
“nobody required it, but I know this is the way it goes.”  
 Most respondents said they paid pozornost to gain some benefits for the child, or simply because it is a 
routine part of the educational process.  Fifty-six to 75 percent of those paying attention at the 
secondary and university level did so to help the students. 
 According to respondents, the most important reason for bribery of school workers is to gain 
admittance to the school, with over three fourths of households claiming this to be “very often a 
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reason” for bribery of school workers.  Nearly half also report that bribes take place to get better 
grades. 
 The size of the pozornost paid in the education sector range from 35 SK to 50,000 SK, with a median 
of 500 SK.  University students paid the highest bribes by a large margin, averaging nearly 7,000 SK. 
 Households reported that bribes for admittance to higher education are widespread.  Even when 
restricting the sample to those with household members at universities, and those who work in the 
education sector – presumably these respondents have solid information on which to base their 
perceptions – around half the respondents feel that it is absolutely not possible to gain admittance to 
medical or law schools without paying bribes.  Only 14 percent believe it is possible to gain admittance 
to medical school without bribes, only 10 percent for law school.  These responses are consistent with 
the perception – backed up by actual experiences – that unofficial payments are common in the health 
and legal sectors.  The responses also show, quite clearly, that an anticorruption strategy for these 
sectors must take a systemic approach, examining the not just the delivery of judicial and health 
services, but the institutions that train and certify professionals, as well. 
Courts:  Of all the obstacles that enterprises face in their business development, “slowness of courts” was 
selected by 80 percent of enterprises as one of the three most serious obstacles they face; a further 75 
percent of enterprises indicated “low executability of justice” to be a major problem. 
 Among enterprise that had been involved in a recent court case, nearly 19 percent indicated that they 
had encountered bribery. 
 The average bribe was over 25,000 SK, and the median was over 11,000 SK, more than any of the 
other 20 governmental bodies covered by the enterprise survey. 
 Courts received a dismal quality rating, among the worst in the survey.  Only one out of nine 
enterprises that were involved in court cases gave favorable ratings for quality. 
 Of the 13 percent of households that were involved in court trials, 25 percent gave something “special” 
to a court employee, judge, or attorney.  The rate was highest among those who were the accusing 
parties in civil trials, such as divorces, property disputes, etc. – 32 percent made such unofficial 
payments. 
 Thirty five percent of enterprises evaluated their experiences with the courts unfair or biased, and 30 
percent felt is was corrupt – less than 17 percent felt the process was fast and without unnecessary 
delays. 
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 More than half of the households that paid bribes at a court visit said they did so “to speed up the trial.” 
Seventeen percent said the main reason was to influence the court’s decision, and 12 percent said they 
gave out of gratefulness.  
 Twenty seven percent of households said that the quality of work in the judiciary has worsened over 
the previous three years, while only 7 percent said it had improved.   
 Forty-five percent of households said bribery in the judicial system had worsened over the previous 
three years, while only 2 percent said it had improved. 
Police: One in twelve Slovak households said that a household member had been a victim of a violent 
crime in the previous 3 years; nearly one in four said they had been victims of property-related crimes.  
Many of these crimes went unreported: 43 percent of violent crimes and 31 percent of property-related 
crimes were not reported to the police.  Of those that were reported to the police, only 21 percent of violent 
crimes and 16 percent of property-related crimes were solved, according to respondents.  Of those that did 
report the crimes, few were satisfied with the investigations: 24 percent and 17 percent for violent and 
property-related crimes, respectively. 
 Although victims of crimes were generally unsatisfied with the investigative efforts of the police, only 
two victims of violent crimes (less than 4 percent), and seven victims of  property-related crime (also 
less than 4 percent), reported having paid some pozornost.  Only a single victim of either type of crime 
reported paying money. One victim of a crime reported that the police workers required the bribe, the 
balance saying either that they gave voluntarily, or they “know this is the way it goes.”  
 In their functions as issuers of identity cards, passports, and driving licenses, the police receive very 
high marks for satisfaction and for the low need for unofficial payments. Satisfaction ratings are 
among the highest, and experiences with corruption among the lowest of the bodies and services rated 
by households. 
 In Slovakia, the traffic police receive much poorer ratings from the citizenry than do their counterparts 
in criminal investigations and issuing documents.  Of the 388 respondents to the household survey that 
have driver’s licenses and own cars, 37 percent reported that they have paid a bribe to a traffic 
policeman at least once, and 19 percent said they had done so several times.  
Cadastre:  Most households that interacted with the cadastre reported being satisfied with their experience, 
although the fact that 40 percent were not satisfied suggests much room for improvement.  Roughly one in 
seven households that had visited the cadastre reported making an unofficial payment, the majority of those 
feeling that it was necessary to do so. 
Banking Services:  Nearly three fourths of the enterprises surveyed reported interacting with banks in the 
previous twelve months.  Little more than half of enterprises that contact banks gave favorable quality 
ratings, and one in nine firms reported encountering bribery.  Banking services stand out for the size of the 
bribes that are paid, averaging over 60,000 SK.  Bribe sizes ranged from 2 to 30 percent of the value of the 
loan, with the average for state and private banks being nearly the same. 
Utilities:  Of the enterprises that contacted the phone company, 18 percent reported paying bribes – among 
households that contacted the telephone company for line installation of maintenance, 7 percent said they 
paid bribes.  Enterprises and households alike gave mediocre to poor ratings for quality. One in ten 
enterprises that had contact with water, gas, or electricity companies reported paying a bribe, and only half 
of enterprises gave a favorable rating.  Households similarly reported having to make unofficial payments:  
16 percent of those with contact paid unofficially for water connection or repair, 18 percent for gas, and 19 
percent for electricity. 
Business Registration:  Among the firms that interacted with the business registry in Slovakia, 15 percent 
reported that they had paid some bribe, and less than 40 percent gave a favorable quality assessment.  
Moreover, the business registry is among the organizations with the most expensive bribes, averaging over 
6,000 SK.  The year when registering companies were most likely to pay bribes was 1994.  
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Import, Export and Other Licenses:  Nearly 15 percent of enterprises in the sample had obtained an 
export license in the two years before the survey, and 21 percent had received an import license. 
 Of those who had tried to get an import or export license in the previous twelve months, one in three 
encountered bribery.  Moreover, while small enterprises were less likely to seek an import or export 
license, those that did were more likely to encounter bribery.   
 Most  enterprises – 74 percent for export licenses and 63 percent for import licenses – reported the 
process of assigning licenses to be transparent.  The data suggest, however, that while transparency 
helps to limit the practice – enterprises who found the process of assigning import licenses to be non-
transparent were more than twice as likely to report paying a bribe – it is not sufficient to ensure non-
corrupt allocation of licenses: more than one in five enterprises that reported the process to be 
transparent also said they had paid a bribe in order to get the import or export license. 
 Over half of enterprises that had obtained export or import licenses reported that they used 
connections, political influence, or outright bribes in order to win the licenses. 
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 Twenty-three percent of the enterprises that received other types of licenses (e.g., retail trade licenses) 
reported paying a bribe, and the assessment of quality was dismal with less than one if four enterprises 
reporting favorably.  
Construction Permits: Construction permits were among the worst of the 21 bodies and services 
evaluated in the enterprise survey in terms of bribery.  Over 30 percent of the enterprises that had been in 
contact in the previous twelve months reported paying a bribe, and only 28 percent gave a favorable quality 
rating.  
Fire Supervision:  Roughly 14 percent of the enterprises that came into contact with the fire supervision 
reported that they had paid a bribe, with small firms paying the most frequently.  Quality ratings, however, 
were better than most, with over 60 percent of enterprises reporting favorably.  
Office of Environmental Protection: One in eight enterprises that interacted with the environmental 
protection reported paying bribes, and the quality rating was fairly poor, with less than 40 percent reporting 
satisfactory treatment.  
Certification Authority:  More than 30 percent (38 percent for small firms) of the firms that contacted the 
Certification Authority reported paying bribes, and only one firm in four gave a favorable quality rating to 
the organization.  
State Business Supervision:  Over 27 percent of the firms with contact reported paying bribes (30 percent 
for small firms), and less than a third gave a favorable quality rating.  
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Labor Security Authority:  Thirteen percent of the enterprises that contacted the Labor Security Authority 
reported paying a bribe.  Half the enterprises gave a favorable quality rating. 
Tax:  Nine percent of the enterprises that contacted the tax authority reported paying a bribe; less than 40 
percent gave a favorable quality rating.  
Customs:  One in three enterprises that interacted with customs reported paying a bribe, and only 17 
percent gave a favorable quality rating, among the worst in the sample.  While some bribes are very high – 
one was reported to be 100,000 SK – the median bribe size is relatively low. 
 
Cross-Sectoral Issues: 
Unofficial Financing of Political Parties:  In Slovakia, 11 percent of enterprises reported that firms like 
theirs “sponsor political parties”, and 8 percent admitted that firms like theirs provide unofficial payments 
to sponsor political parties.    While firms of all sizes admitted this practice, larger firms reported unofficial 
sponsoring at a higher rate:  one of eight firms with more than 15 employees said they provided unofficial 
payments to political parties. 
Sixty-three percent of firms that admitted to unofficially sponsoring political parties reported paying a bribe 
in the 3 years before the survey, while only 40 percent of those who do not sponsor political parties 
reported paying bribes.  Moreover, a glance at the relationship between unofficial sponsoring of political 
parties and various other forms of corruption illuminates how the practice twists public policy toward 
corruption – unofficial sponsoring of political parties is highly correlated with the use of political pressure 
to obtain state subsidies.   
National Property Fund:    Forty-one percent of privatized enterprises said corruption in the national 
Property Fund was very widespread, and a further 33 percent said it does exist but they can not judge the 
extent.  Less than 2 percent of privatized enterprises said that corruption does not exist at the National 
Property Fund. 
Subsidies:  One out of five enterprises reported receiving some form of subsidies from the state.  Of those, 
12 percent reported paying a bribes to get the subsidy, always in combination with either political influence 
or connections with friends or relatives. Sixty-one percent reported that the process was transparent, 
meaning that nearly 2 in 5 reported otherwise.  When asked how much must be paid as a bribe in order to 
get the subsidy, the majority reported that 10 percent of the subsidy amount must be given in bribes.  
Although “only” 10-12 percent5 admitted paying bribes to get the subsidies, the process was subverted in 
other ways, as well.  Nearly 40 percent admitted to using friends or relatives to get the subsidies, and 7 
percent admitted to using political influence.  
Selling to the State:  One in three enterprises reported that they sell some of their products or services to 
the state, and of those, 28 percent receive at least a quarter of their revenues from state sales.  Of the firms 
with sales to the state, one in four reported that firms like theirs pay bribes to win state contracts.  Those 
that are more dependent on state sales report even high bribe frequencies.  Of the firms in the sample that 
derive more than a quarter of their revenues from state sales, 42 percent reported that firms like theirs pay 
bribes in order to win contracts with the state.  
Public Sector Tenders:  Thirty percent of enterprises reported that they had participated in at least one 
tender in the two years before the survey, and nearly all of those firms participated in multiple tenders.  
These tenders were organized by ministries, local state administration, local self-government, state and 
private companies, banks, and other institutions.  Very few of these enterprises believe that public sector 
tenders can be won entirely without bribes, and many believe that bribery for public sector tenders occurs 
                                                          
5 Overall, 12 percent of enterprises that received subsidies said they paid a bribe after deleting refusals.  To calculate 
the values in Figure 23 required also dropping refusals to two other questions, resulting in a slightly different sample – 
in the second sample, 10.4 percent of enterprises admitted paying bribes. 
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frequently.  One third of enterprises that declined to participate in a tender cited the need for unofficial 
payments as an important reason.  
 
5. Corruption and the Public Sector 
The 352 public officials that participated in the survey provided a wealth of information on the internal 
incentives they face, the existence and implementation of formal rules, the manner in which they interact 
with the public and with the private sector.  While most public officials reported  that rules were sound and 
well implemented, there is sufficient variation in responses to identify characteristics of public 
administration that weaken the ability of the public sector to deliver quality services, and create 
opportunities for corrupt behavior.  Understanding these weaknesses helps to give direction to the 
prevention aspect of anticorruption.   
Responses to the public official survey confirm the findings from the household and enterprise surveys that 
the use of gifts and bribes is common.  More than two out of five officials said they had been offered a gift, 
and one in ten had been offered money or an expensive present, in the two years before the survey. Of 
those who frequently interact with the public, roughly half had been offered small gifts, and 10-15 percent 
had been offered money or expensive presents. 
Public officials also clearly indicated that the offers of bribes by clients were sometimes accepted at their 
institutions.  Nearly a quarter of the central government officials reported that corruption was widespread at 
their institution, and nearly half of the officials at the regional and district bodies of state administration 
report the same. A smaller percentage of officials from local self-governments reported corruption to be 
widespread. 
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Corruption: Poor Quality, Slow Service Delivery, and Excessive Bureaucracy:  While most public 
officials feel that their institutions offer quality services, it is also true that most believe that incentives to 
generate quality service delivery do not exist in their institutions.  Data from the public official’s survey 
confirms that from the perspective of the public official, high quality service in associated with low levels 
of corruption.  Similarly, slowness of service delivery fosters corruption – from the perspective of an 
enterprise waiting for a permit, or a household waiting for their day in court, a bribe may be a small price to 
pay speed things along.  Responses to the public official’s survey suggests that corruption is greatly 
facilitated by slow service delivery, which in turn is frequently generated by bureaucratic rules that hinder 
an institution’s ability to deliver services quickly.  
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Perceptions of Punishment:  The public officials survey shows enforcement of anticorruption rules can 
play an important role in reducing corruption.  When asked how a confirmed case of bribery would be dealt 
with in their institution, 22 percent of officials responded that they did not know how bribery is punished 
within their institution, roughly the same for all three levels of government. Only about half the 
respondents believe the person would be dismissed or accused of a crime. 
Despite the fact that half of the officials understand the penalty for corruption to be dismissal or worse, 
there seems to be among many respondents a tolerance for accepting bribes.  Less than 12 percent of the 
surveyed officials indicated that they would certainly report a peer who accepted a bribe, while 15 percent 
indicated they definitely would not report such a case; more respondents said they would probably not 
report such a case than said they probably would.  Of those who said they probably would not report, many 
cited the fear of harming themselves (e.g., “I am afraid for my job”), and a distaste for hurting colleagues 
(e.g., “I don’t want to cause problems for them”). 
Organizational Mission and Objectives:  Slovak officials generally reported that the people within their 
institutions understand their institution’s objectives and strategies, identify with those objectives, and view 
citizens and users as their clients – at every level of government, two out of three officials reported as 
much.  There is variation, however, in responses across levels of government.  Those in local self-
government felt the most closely identified with an organizational mission, and were much more likely to 
view the citizen as client.  
Organizations whose staff are offered gifts most frequently are those whose staff understand their mission 
the least.  Moreover, the people within a given organization who understand the mission best are least 
likely to have been offered a small gift.  Institutions with staff that more fully identify with the institution’s 
objectives are also the institutions which are perceived by the officials who work there to have lower levels 
of corruption. 
Internal Administration:  Respondents overwhelmingly reported that the procedures, guidelines, and 
regulations of internal management existed in a formal, written form with 97 percent of respondents 
replying as much. Most also reported that the rules and procedures were relevant to the institution’s 
objectives (82 percent), and are simple, clear and easy to understand (83 percent).  Despite their formal 
existence, however, only 57 percent of respondents said that the rules of internal administration are 
implemented, and only 58 percent said the rules are monitored.  Only half the respondents said the rules of 
internal administration are enforced.   
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 The institutions in which the procedures and rules “add too much time to the process of decision 
making and service delivery” were also the most corrupt. 
 Clarity and simplicity of the procedures were highly associated with low corruption. 
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 Institutions where the number of agencies and departments involved in decision making were 
appropriate also had lower levels of corruption.  
 Many officials reported that their supervisors, peers, and they themselves “sometimes act on their own 
accounts” – less than half say they follow one predefined official procedure. Where discretion is 
highest, so is corruption. 
Personnel Policy: Eight out of ten officials reported that personnel decisions (recruitment, appointments, 
promotions, salary increases) are based on formal, written, rules, and the majority believe that personnel 
decisions are based on merit and qualifications.  While these responses are encouraging, it is clear that 
personnel decisions are also based on other factors.  More than one out of three respondents said that 
political affiliation affects personnel decisions, and 40 percent said that changes in political administration 
affected personnel policies; 19 percent said family connections were important, and 26 percent said that 
regional connections were important.  One out of sixteen officials said that unofficial payments played a 
role in personnel decisions. 
The quality of personnel policy and degree of meritocracy are highly correlated with the level of corruption 
within an institution; the existence of patronage and connections within the institutions, and the use of 
informal payments are statistically the most important dimensions of personnel policy contributing to 
corruption. The strength of this result confirms that anticorruption involves much more than putting bribe 
payers and bribe takers in jail – implementation of a merit-based civil service is also a key element of an 
anticorruption strategy.  
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Internal Channels of Communication:  Public officials generally responded positively when asked about 
the channels of communications within their organizations, although there were marked differences 
between the levels of government, with local self-governments reporting the most open channels of 
communications.  
The openness of channels of communication is negatively correlated with corruption – where the internal 
channels of communication are the greatest, the level of corruption is the least. This result holds both 
between governmental organizations (organizations that have the most open communications have the least 
corruption), and within organizations (people who view the lines of communications as open are less likely 
to believe that corruption is widespread in their organization). 
Freedom of Information:  Openness provides the electorate the information needed to evaluate the 
fairness, transparency, and efficiency of their government bodies, and holds promise as a means for 
encouraging public sector efficiency and limiting corruption.  A reform such as the Free Information 
Access Act (FIAA), however, will only be effective if it is implemented – implementation may be 
undermined if there is strong resistance among the public sector officials entrusted with implementation.  
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The survey of public officials asked a series of question on support for openness in general, support for the 
FIAA in particular, and concerns that officials have about implementation of the FIAA. 
 At all levels of government respondents reported that information is provided on demand; local self-
governments are much more likely to post information in public areas, and the central state 
administration is much more likely to put information on the internet.  Ninety-eight percent of all 
respondents said that information is provided to the public in at least some form, and 90 percent 
provide it in writing.  Among particular bodies, the courts stand out for relying on “information on 
demand” – none of the respondents from the courts reported that activity reports are issued. 
 On an abstract level, most officials support the notions of open access to decision-making, and 
recognize the positive effect that transparency would have on decisions.  Over 80 percent of officials 
believe decision making processes should be open, and nearly 90 percent believe that publishing 
decisions would force decision makers to follow more reasonable approaches.  
 The survey of public officials asked officials whether they believed that the FIAA was necessary, and 
80 percent said that it is.  Belief in the need for such an Act is highest among central government 
officials and lowest among officials of the regional bodies of the central government. 
 Only 35 percent felt that the work of their institution would become more complicated by the FIAA, 
while 59 percent felt that such an act would probably not complicate their work.  Indeed, an official’s 
opinion on the need an FIAA and support of the reform is very highly correlated with the degree to 
which she feels the work of the institution would be more complicated as a result of the reform.   
The survey responses provide reason for optimism regarding openness such as that proposed in the Free 
Information Access Act.  There is a good deal of support for the reforms among public officials.  Those that 
don’t support the reforms, and could ultimately undermine its effectiveness, are those that are concerned 
over the details of implementation.  Throughout this report, a consistent theme is that corruption stems in 
part from bureaucracy and inefficiency – while the FIAA may bring greater openness, lack of attention to 
the details of implementation could bring unnecessary bureaucracy and thereby reduce the effectiveness of 
this important reform. 
Decentralization: At every level of government, the officials themselves reported having greater faith in 
the honesty and integrity of local self-governments than of the central state or regional state administration.  
Local self-governments also exhibit higher levels of some qualities of public administration discussed in 
this report: staff more closely identify with the organizational mission, are more likely to consider citizens 
to be their clients, follow more sound personnel policies, and have the most open channels of 
communication.  However, local self-governments are softer on bribe takers and are more likely to use 
discretion, rather than following clear rules.  Moreover, 0the competencies of the current self-governments 
are very limited relative to those envisioned by the new regional self-governments, and lower levels of 
corruption may simply reflect this fact. 
Support for Reforms:  As a whole, public officials reported generally high levels of support for many 
kinds of public administration reforms.  The most popular reforms, from the public official’s perspective, 
are increasing transparency in political party funding, administrative simplification, and establishing a 
merit-based civil service.  The least popular reforms are the privatization of public services, administrative 
decentralization, setting performance targets and standards, and reducing public sector employment (with 
an increase in the salaries of those who remain).  While these reforms are less popular than the others 
included in the survey, the level of support is still high. With the exception of privatization of public 
services, each of these “less popular” reforms are supported by well over half of the public officials 
surveyed. 
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6. Summary of Key Findings 
The surveys of households, enterprises, and public officials, have provided a wealth of information on 
perceptions and actual experiences with corruption in Slovakia.  Regarding the levels and trends: 
 Corruption is perceived to be widespread and especially problematic in health, justice, the National 
Property Fund, customs, police, and ministries.  The perceptions are buttressed by actual experiences – 
many enterprises and ordinary people reported paying bribes, and many public officials reported 
having been offered gifts or money by clients.  Of the fifty bodies and services reported on by 
households and enterprises, there were reports of bribery for every single one. 
 Corruption is more widespread than ten years ago, but the recent trends are less clear.  While there is 
some evidence that the corruption problem has improved somewhat compared to a few years ago, 
many believe that it is as bad today as ever.  Corruption remains a significant problem that must be 
addressed. 
The surveys help to highlight the sectors most affected, and the reasons the unofficial payments are made in 
these sectors: 
 The courts were identified by all three sample groups as slow and largely corrupt.  Slowness of courts 
and low executability of justice were identified by enterprises are severe problems doing business, and 
both households and enterprises reported that they frequently encounter bribery in their experiences 
with courts. 
 The health sector is perceived by all three sample groups as a sector with widespread corruption.  The 
survey of households confirmed this perception – pozornost was paid for hospital stays far more often 
than for any other public sector body or service about which households reported.  Despite the fact that 
some said their pozornost was paid voluntarily, the widespread perception that corruption is rife in the 
health sector suggests that even these “voluntary” payments are considered “corruption” by the 
population.  The lack of clear guidelines delineating acceptable tokens of appreciation from 
unacceptable bribes, adds to confusion and strengthens the perception of corruption. 
 Corruption in the educational system is centered mostly around universities.  Moreover, there is a 
widespread perception that one can not gain admittance to law or medical schools without paying 
bribes.  Reforms within the justice system and the health sector, both reported to have widespread 
corruption, should also address the educational institutions that produce the new cadres of 
professionals.  
 Several regulatory and licensing bodies are reported to be the frequent recipients of bribes:  import and 
export permits, construction permits, and other licenses, the Business Registry (run by the courts), 
Certification Authority, Customs, and State Business Supervision, all were reported by the enterprises 
that deal with them to be frequent recipients of bribes.  Reducing bureaucracy and administrative 
barriers, already part of the National Program, will be a key component of a strategy to reduce the 
levels of bribery among regulatory and licensing bodies. 
 Roughly one in nine enterprises said they sponsor political parties.  Most enterprises believe that it is a 
common practice, although a larger percentage believe it was common practice before the 1998 
elections.  Clarifying and making more transparent the interface between politicians and private 
enterprises should be a top priority.  Attempting to influence policy is natural and even useful – but 
when the influence comes through non-transparent sponsoring of parties, the result is often corruption.  
Indeed, enterprises that sponsor political parties were more likely than other enterprises to use political 
pressure as a means of getting state subsidies.  Although the component of the National Program on 
“transparency in political life” may be contentious, the findings in this report suggest that it will be 
crucial for a sustained anticorruption effort. 
 Similarly, many enterprises reported paying bribes to receive state subsidies, and many more reported 
using political influence and connections with friends and relatives to get the subsidies.  Many firms 
that regularly sell to the state reported that firms like theirs routinely pay bribes to win contracts, and 
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most enterprises that have participated in tenders believe that it is very difficult to win public sector 
tenders without paying bribes.  
 Rewarding cronies with favorable, non-transparent, privatization decisions can be more pernicious 
than other forms of corruption, since it tends to institutionalize corruption.  There is a perception that 
corruption is widespread at the National Property Fund, a perception also held by the subset of 
privatized enterprises.   
In many ways, identifying the problem of corruption is easier than identifying its source or its solution.  
The public officials survey helps to provide guidance on the weaknesses that lead to corruption, and some 
reforms that may help prevent corruption.  
 The surveys show clearly that corruption is associated with bureaucracy, with firms and households 
paying bribes to speed the processes along.  Public sector institutions at which employees report that 
rules hinder their ability to deliver services in a timely manner have more widespread corruption 
problems.  Public administration reforms that increase efficiency and decrease bureaucratic delays will 
help to reduce corruption.  The use of client surveys by the organizations themselves can help to 
highlight weaknesses and suggest areas for improvement in organizational performance.  
 The lack of clear guidelines for the acceptance of gifts leaves officials with no guidance for acceptable 
behaviors.  A Code of Ethics, of the sort envisioned in the National Program, will help to clarify this 
important issue.  Similarly, administrative procedures for disciplining staff can serve an important 
purpose as a deterrent. 
 Corruption is significantly influenced by many factors that characterize the administration of the public 
sector:   
 the clarity of information flows within the organization 
 identification of staff with the organization’s objectives and strategies 
 the quality of internal administration, and the implementation of clear, unambiguous, 
predefined procedures of internal administration 
 the level of meritocracy and the quality of personnel policies 
 Among these factors, each of which are related to each other, the existence of 
meritocracy and the quality of internal administration exhibit the strongest relationship 
with the level of corruption.  
 While local self-governments do seem to have less widespread corruption problems than bodies of 
state administration, it is not clear that decentralization will help to reduce corruption, since the 
competencies of the local self-governments are few compared to the proposed competencies of the 
regional self-governments.  Well planned implementation of the new Concept of Public Administration 
will be the key to ensuring the benefits of a decentralized state, without allowing corruption to fill the 
vacuums that emerge during the decentralization process. 
 Most officials understand the need for openness of the sort envisioned in the draft Free Information 
Access Act and support the concept of open, transparent, decision making.  Those that are most 
concerned about the law are the ones who believe it will complicate the work of their institutions.  As 
bureaucracy and slow service delivery have been identified as contributors to corruption, the 
implementation of the Free Information Access Act should be undertaken with care not to 
unnecessarily complicate the work of the employees that must administer it. 
 Public officials were broadly supportive of a number of public sector reforms.  They were most 
supportive of transparency in political party financing, administrative simplification, and establishment 
of a merit-based civil service.  As bureaucracy and non-merit personnel policies were identified to be 
closely correlated with corruption, measures to simplify administrative procedures and establish a 
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merit-based civil service should be high on the public sector agenda.  Likewise, the unambiguous 
benefits of transparency in party financing, and the strong support among officials, highlight the 
importance of reforms in this area.  
 The survey responses exhibit a high degree of acceptance of corruption.  Many officials said they 
would not turn in colleagues they knew to be taking bribes, and both households and enterprises that 
paid bribes usually said that the bribe was not explicitly required by the official but assumed to be 
necessary.  Many seem resigned to a deepening of corruption:  only one in nine Slovaks believe that 
corruption will abate in the next three years, while one in three thinks it will get worse.  When the 
survey was administered in the fall of 1999, 48 percent of the population felt that the Government was 
not serious about solving the corruption problem, and 60 percent felt likewise about the National 
Council.  These facts add impetus to the Education component of the National Program, which seeks 
to educate the public about the problem of corruption and what they can do about it.  One notable 
success story in the fight against corruption, Hong Kong, also used surveys to highlight problems and 
also successfully employed a public education campaign to reduce tolerance for the practice. 
Since the summer of 1999, momentum for anticorruption has grown steadily with the establishment of the 
Anticorruption Steering Committee led by the Deputy Prime Minister, development and public 
dissemination of the National Program for the Fight Against Corruption, and public statements by the 
Prime Minister that anticorruption is a top priority of the Government.  Maintaining this momentum by 
developing an Action Plan with a clear timetable for delivery can help to regain the public’s trust, keeping 
Slovakia on track of rebuilding an efficient, transparent, open public sector that serves the citizenry and 
business sector, rather than the other way around. 
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 1. Overview 
 
Although corruption has always existed, recognition of the negative impact of corruption on society has 
broadened greatly in recent years.  A growing body of research shows that corruption represents not just the 
degradation of integrity and morals, but a severe hindrance to the process of economic development6:  
Corruption stymies investment and growth and misdirects public resources; corruption systematically 
redistributes wealth in favor of those with the connections and money to work the system; corruption acts 
as a regressive tax, felt most harshly by small businesses, micro-enterprise, and the poor; corruption erodes 
confidence in the institutions of state and is associated with organized crime; for lawful taxpayers, 
corruption erodes the quality of the public services upon which citizens rely and for which they pay taxes. 
International recognition of the anticorruption imperative has come in the decade following the fall of 
communism in the former Soviet block.  Regional comparisons of indicators of corruption perceptions rank 
the new states of the CIS near the bottom.; Central and Eastern Europe fairs better, but remains clearly 
separated from the mor3e developed economies of the OECD.  The reasons for this poor performance are 
many, but the nature of the transition itself has surely contributed.  The challenge of creating the 
institutions of democracy and market economies, supplanting the clandestine state of communism with a 
new one based on freedom and openness, has proved formidable – the “transition” is now in its second 
decade for many countries.  The old system, in which the governing bodies of state and the economy were 
tightly fused, has in many countries given way to new structures in which enterprises, the citizenry and the 
state maintain an arms-length relationship with the nature of the relationship dictated by new rules, the 
development and implementation of which are nascent.  Although the pace of change in transition countries 
has generally been slower than anticipated a decade ago, the magnitude of the changes in the everyday lives 
of the people in the region has been tremendous.  While the nature of the relationship has changed, the 
devolution of state ownership has also been remarkable.  Given the changes in the nature of the 
relationships, the rapidity with which people were required to adapt, and the massive redistribution of state 
assets in a short period of time, the expansiveness of corruption in the transition countries is no surprise. 
Recognition of the devastation corruption wreaks on economic development has led some major donors to 
move anticorruption to positions of prominence on their development agendas.  In 1996 James 
Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, extended an open offer to help member countries with the 
struggle against corruption, and many have formally requested assistance.  Similarly, the United State 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has long been a leader in the battle against corruption by 
promoting transparency, establishing checks and balances, and strengthening the rule of law.  Both the 
World Bank and USAID are now supporting programs that minimize the opportunities for corruption, 
change the incentive structures that encourage corruption, and mobilize public support for change.  A 
growing number of countries have sought to tackle the problem of corruption, requesting assistance from 
these institutions.  Those that have requested assistance are not necessarily those with the worst problems – 
on the contrary, they may be the ones that have demonstrated the courage to tackle this vexing issue. 
Following elections in late 1998, the new coalition Government of the Slovak Republic recognized the 
harmful effects of corruption and placed anticorruption high on the official agenda.  Key milestones were 
reached in 1999 when the Prime Minister participated in a public conference on corruption; with the 
formation of an Anticorruption Steering Committee under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister; and 
with the first drafting of the National Program for the Fight Against Corruption later in the year. In the 
                                                          
6 Empirical studies include Paulo Mauro “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110-1995: 681-
712; Paulo Mauro “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country 
Analysis”, in Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington DC, Institute for 
International Economics, 1997; Daniel Kaufmann, “Corruption: The Facts”, Foreign Policy, Summer 1997, 114-131; 
Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei, “Does ‘Grease  Money’ Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?”, NBER Working 
Paper 7093, 1999. 
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summer of 1999, the Government requested that the World Bank and USAID conduct a diagnostic study to 
help provide information on the pattern and profile of corruption in Slovakia. 
A key feature of the public discourse in Slovakia has been the role played by non-governmental actors, 
organizing conferences and participating in the Steering Committee.  One such organization, Transparency 
International Slovakia, was instrumental in drafting the National Program.  The openness demonstrated by 
including non-governmental bodies as active participants in developing a national strategy is congruent 
with the openness of public administration that will help fight corruption. 
A revised draft of the National Program is currently circulating7 for a forty day public debate while an 
Action Plan is being prepared.  The National Program seeks “to combat corruption in Slovakia, especially 
in public life and in the use of public funds and resources.”  The National Program itself provides the 
framework that the effort to fight corruption will take – an Action Plan, due out in mid-2000, will contain 
specific commitments, assign specific responsibilities, and outline a timetable for completion.  
Although in many transition countries information about the pattern and profile of corruption relies of 
anecdotal stories and rumors, rather than analysis, the current report builds on momentum for analytical 
analysis that was already underway.  Certain non-governmental organizations, notably the Center for 
Economic Development and Transparency International Slovakia, have organized workshops on topics 
such as “Transparency in the Slovak Economy”, producing conference volumes based in part on surveys8 
of households and enterprises on perceptions of corruption.  A detailed report entitled Faces of 
Corruption9, released in the summer of 1999, probes deeply into the underlying sectors whose incentives, 
structure, and lack of oversight and accountability make corruption a strong temptation.  The present report, 
relying on survey evidence, complements the analytical work of these NGOs by providing more detailed 
quantitative information about corruption – for an analytical view of the vulnerabilities of specific sectors, 
Faces of Corruption remains the definitive reference. 
For this study, the survey research firm “Focus” was selected in a tender to administer questionnaires on 
perceptions and experiences with corruption to three distinct groups: households, enterprise managers, and 
public officials.  Each of the samples was designed to be national in scope, with respondents drawn from all 
eight of the regions of Slovakia.  Over 350 public officials, 400 enterprise managers, and 1,100 ordinary 
people participated in the study.10 
 The household sample was stratified by gender, age, education, nationality, size of community and 
region of residence, and is therefore representative of the adult population of Slovakia.   
 The enterprise sample was chosen from among officially registered enterprises.  As 85 percent of the 
enterprises that are officially registered are natural persons, a random sample from the enterprise 
registry would have resulted in a sample dominated by small entrepreneurs, with very few limited 
liability or joint stock companies.  For this reason, the enterprise sample was balanced to have 
relatively more corporate entities than found in the population – roughly one third of the sample was 
made up of joint stock companies, limited liability companies, and natural person, respectively.  The 
sample is representative within each of these three categories.   
 A representative sample of the public sector would be dominated by local self-government (which 
would make up two thirds of the sample) and especially by mayors and local deputies (which would be 
nearly half of the sample).  To achieve a sample that also contains significant representation for, the 
sample was divided roughly in thirds between (i) the central government, (ii) regional and district 
bodies of the central state administration, and (iii) and local self-government.  Within each of these 
                                                          
7 The National Program can be found on the web at http://www.government.gov.sk/bojprotikorupcii/ . 
8 The surveys were undertaken by the survey research firm “Focus.” 
9 The contributors to Faces of Corruption were Emil Burak, Miroslav Danihel, Olga Gyarfasova, Lucia Haulikova, 
Eugen Jurzyca, Pavol Roharik, Vladislav Rosa, Eduard Sabopal, Emilia Sicakova, Luubica Slimakova, Jiri Vlach, 
Ladislav Tichy, and Daniela Zemanovicova. 
10 These sample sizes are useful for many statistical purposes, but limit the degree to which data can be disaggregated.  
For multivariate analysis, however, these sample sizes are generally sufficient. 
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sub-sample, bodies were chosen proportionately.  Managers and ordinary officials were chosen in a 
proportion of 1 to 6.  The sample is representative within each of these three categories.   
Table 1 provides the sample breakdown by region.  Tables with greater detail on sampling are provided in 
Annex 1. 
Table 1.  Regional Distribution of Sample* 
 Households Enterprises Public Officials 
Number of observations 1,131 407 352 
Percent of observations in:    
Bratislava 11.5 26.3 34.7 
Trnava 10.2 8.1 5.4 
Trencín 11.3 8.6 6.5 
Nitra 13.3 16.2 8.8 
Žilina 12.8 12.5 7.4 
Banská Bystrica 12.3 10.1 13.9 
Prešov 14.4 7.6 12.8 
Košice 14.1 10.6 10.5 
    
*Detailed sample characteristics can be found in Annex 1. 
 
The surveys reveal that corruption is common and affects all key sectors of the economy.  Individual 
citizens were most affected in the social sectors, with 60 percent indicating payment of bribes to obtain 
hospital services and between a quarter and a third for other medical services and higher education. 
Enterprises are most affected by licensing and regulatory bodies, courts and customs, with incidences of 
bribes reported by one-third for a number of these offices. All three groups of respondents identified the 
judicial system as a major area of corruption, with enterprises reporting frequent bribes in court cases and 
citing slow courts and low execution of justice as the most important obstacles to doing business.  
Moreover, households report paying frequent bribes to court personnel, especially to speed up the process,  
and those who found experiences with courts to be inefficient and slow were much more likely to report 
that the process was corrupt.  Many firms reported that they unofficially sponsor political parties. 
The public officials survey demonstrates that corruption is closely related to the quality of the institutions 
of public administration.  The bodies with the lowest levels of corruption were those in which the lines of 
internal communications were clear, administrative rules were well-implemented, personnel decisions were 
based on merit rather than connections or 
corruption, and the organization’s 
mission was widely understood by staff.  
The level of meritocracy is particularly 
strong for explaining levels of corruption.  
The surveys also make clear that while 
most public officials at all levels of 
government support public sector 
reforms, they are relatively more 
concerned about the practical 
implementation of the reforms. 
This report draws from, and builds upon, earlier analytical
work on corruption, transparency, and public sector
performance in Slovakia.  In the same way, this report
should be viewed as one input into a continuous process of
understanding corruption in Slovakia.  Other analytical
tools, such as focus groups, expert analyses, public forums,
and regular monitoring of perception and experiences with
corruption should continue to maintain momentum and
build awareness of what can be done to reduce corruption.
Section 2 presents the summary measures indicating the overall scope of the problem of corruption in 
Slovakia and current trends as reported by survey respondents.  Section 3 summarizes the actual 
experiences of survey respondents with corruption, sector by sector.  Section 4 follows with an analysis of 
corruption in cross-sectoral fields such as procurement and subsidies.  Section 5 highlights the crucial link 
between public sector administration and levels of corruption.  Section 6 summarizes the key findings of 
the report. 
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2. Levels and Trends of Corruption in Slovakia 
 
How Bad is Corruption in Slovakia? 
 
Corruption is a serious problem throughout the post-socialist world.11  While many argue that corruption 
was also a significant problem under the old system, and many believe that its historical and cultural 
origins stretch back even further, most observers agree that the pervasiveness of corruption has expanded 
since the fall of communism.  With these observations in mind, it is clear that there can not be a simple 
answer to the question that opens this section since the severity of the problem depends on the standards by 
which the situation in Slovakia today is compared. 
While it is difficult to state exactly how 
bad the problem is, the survey results make 
very clear that unofficial payments to 
government officials are common, that 
these payments are viewed by the public as 
“corruption”, and that corruption is 
hindering the public sector’s delivery of 
quality services to the citizenry.  Roughly 
one out of seven households and one out of 
six enterprises reported having paid some 
pozornost in the previous two months; in 
the three years before the surveys, more 
than 40 percent of households and enterprises paid some pozornost.  The public officials confirm the 
ubiquity of the practice.  Over 40 percent said they had been offered small gifts in the previous two years, 
and 10 percent said they had been offered cash or an expensive present.12,13  The breadth of the problem is 
also notable.  The household and enterprise questionnaires inquired about interactions with over fifty 
governmental bodies or public services, and bribes were reported for every single one. 
The Slovak word pozornost translates directly as
“attention”, and is understood to mean some gift, money,
or counter service that is provided in order to get better
treatment.  In some cases, pozornost may be provided
willingly as an expression of appreciation. The survey of
households, therefore, asked respondents not only whether
they paid pozornost, but also the reason for the payment.
This issues is particularly important for health care, in
which small gifts may be traditional or merely expressions
of gratitude. 
While the statistics in the previous paragraph make clear that unofficial payments are common, they do not 
indicate how much of a problem corruption is for those that encounter it.  But responses to other questions 
indicate forcefully the net cost that corruption imposes on society.  While most bribes revealed by survey 
respondents were small, some were quite large: one respondent reported paying 100,000 SK14 for a hospital 
stay, and some enterprises reported paying up to 100,000 SK for certain types of licenses.  As a share of 
revenues, bribe payments can also be large.  On average, enterprises reported that firms like theirs pay 
more than two percent of revenues in bribes.  Resources that could otherwise be used for investment and 
training are instead transferred to the subset of officials who abuse their positions.  The net cost that 
corruption imposes on firms can also be measured by whether or not they would be willing to pay 
additional taxes to eliminate corruption.  Despite the fact that high tax rates are viewed as a problem for 
business development, one in four enterprises expressed a willingness to pay additional taxes if doing so 
would eliminate corruption – of those that had paid bribes recently, one in three were willing.  Those 
                                                          
11 The most recent study with broad coverage is the EBRD Transition Report 1999. 
12 The figures are even more striking when considering only the opinions of officials that regularly interact with the 
public.  Among officials that regularly interact with enterprises, 53 percent had been offered a small gift, and 15 
percent had been offered cash or an expensive gift. 
13 This question is almost identical to one reported in William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. 
Koshechkina, “Confessions of Justified Sinners: Why Postcommunist Officials Accept Presents and Bribes”, 
University of Glasgow, 1999.  Their survey in 1998 found that in Slovakia 43 percent of officials had been offered a 
small present, and 14 percent had been offered money or an expensive present in the past few years, numbers very 
similar to those found in the surveys central to this report.  Differences in sampling could easily explain the differences 
in responses. 
14 The approximate exchange rate is 40 SK = 1 USD. 
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willing to pay additional taxes to eliminate corruption responded, on average, that they would be willing to 
pay 7.6 percent more in taxes, spotlighting the implicit tax that corruption places on these firms. 
Table 2.  Summary Indicators of Experiences with Corruption 
  
Households  Percent making unofficial payments in previous two months 14.4
 Percent making unofficial payments in previous three years 41.3
  
Enterprises  Percent making unofficial payments in the previous two months 17.6
 Percent making unofficial payments in the previous three years 41.4
  
Public Officials Percent offered a small gift in the previous two years 42.3
 Percent offered money or an expensive gift in the previous two years 9.7
  
 
 
Is Corruption Getting Worse? 
 
Assessing the trends in the levels of corruption is an inherently difficult task since the tools for estimating 
the penetration of corruption in society have only recently been developed.  For Slovakia, three sets of 
survey questions allow some insights into the trends.  First, the questionnaires implemented in Slovakia 
included a question very similar to one that had been asked in sociological studies in Czechoslovakia 
(1989), and the Czech Republic (1998).15  Comparing the results confirms what many have suspected:  
from the perspective of the general public, the levels of bribery are much worse now than ten years ago, 
and may be slightly worse in 
Slovakia than in the Czech 
Republic. 
Figure 1.  Corruption in 1989 and 1999 
 
“What is your opinion of bribery in people’s everyday life in today’s 
society?” 
1= Bribery is altogether a definite part of contemporary life--whoever wants 
to make a living must give 
2=Bribery is no doubt common, but it isn't as terrible as people say 
3=Some give bribes no doubt, but it isn't necessary--with a little patience 
one can also make a living without bribes 
4=Bribes are completely unnecessary--anything can be got through legal 
means 
 
Second, we asked all three 
survey groups in Slovakia 
when they thought corruption 
was the worst in Slovakia.  In 
the opinion of the general 
population, nearly equal 
numbers reported that 
corruption was the worst in the 
period 1994-1998, as it has 
been since 1998.  Enterprise 
managers and public officials, 
however, more strongly 
reported that corruption was 
worse during 1994-1998.  It is 
also clear that many Slovaks 
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2
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4
15 The numbers for Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic were from Pavol Fric, “The State of Corruption after Ten 
Years”.  The original source for 1989 was Institute for Business Research (1643 respondents were surveyed from the 
entire CSSR). The original source for 1998 was GfK-Praha, April 1998 (967 respondents from the Czech Republic).  
The source for the Slovak data is the household survey discussed in this report (1,131 respondents from the Slovak 
Republic).  Responses of “I don’t know” were set equal to missing.  For the Slovakia survey there was a slight change 
in wording which might make the results less comparable:  response 1 did not include the words “…--whoever wants to 
make a living must give.” 
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believe that corruption has been virtually unchanged, with a roughly a third of respondents reporting that 
corruption was the same in all three sample periods. 
Figure 2.  When was corruption the highest in Slovakia? 
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Third, we asked public officials to evaluate how common “unofficial payments” are at their organizations, 
both now and two years earlier.  Although the change is very slight, on average, public officials reported 
that bribery in their organizations was more widespread two years earlier. 
Figure 3. Bribery from the Perspective of Public Officials 
Two Years Ago
does not exist
not very widespread
rather widespread
very widespread
exists but cannot 
judge the extent
Today
does not exist
not very widespread
rather widespread
very widespread
exists but cannot 
judge the extent
 
While the surveys suggest that there may have been some improvement in the levels of corruption relative 
to a few years ago, the message that comes through much more forcefully is that most believe that 
corruption levels have not changed – corruption remains a formidable challenge that must be addressed. 
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 Which Governmental Bodies are Reported to be the Most Corrupt? 
 
While private companies in competitive industries are forced by the market to deliver quality – those that 
do not will lose customers and lose profits – such forces are not effective in the public sector.  The profit 
motive does not exert pressure on public sector bodies and clients generally have no legal alternatives but 
to continue to deal with the public sector bodies, regardless of the quality of services provided. 
One objective of the surveys of enterprises and households was to provide a report card of public sector 
bodies from the perspectives of the clients.  This section of the report provides such a report card, 
summarizing perceptions of levels of corruption in various bodies, and the experiences of enterprises and 
households that deal with various governmental bodies and services. 
Perceptions 
 
The questionnaires of households, enterprises, and public officials collected information about both 
perceptions and experiences with corruption.  Although “perceptions” are frequently dismissed as not 
reflecting reality and as being biased by media reports, there are several reasons for including perceptions 
in an evaluation of corruption.  First, while it is true that perceptions may be distorted by the processes 
through which respondents get information, it must be remembered that perceptions are largely shaped by 
experiences.  Indeed, as discussed below, the data for Slovakia demonstrate very clearly that several of the 
governmental bodies that are perceived as the most corrupt are the very same ones with which respondents 
have had the most experience with corruption. 
Second, an approach focusing entirely on actual experiences would not be balanced, since ordinary people 
and enterprise managers are generally not party to certain forms of high-level corruption, which would 
therefore be under-reported in the surveys. 
Third, even if perceptions are not completely accurate, the perceptions themselves are important. When a 
manager makes a decision of whether to invest or diversify into other sectors, they do so on the basis of 
their perceptions of the business environment (including the level of corruption) that they will face.  When 
a person decides whether to take a dispute to the courts, it is the perception of fairness and cost upon which 
she will base that decision.  Likewise, when a person decides whether to get treatment from a medical 
facility, it is the perception of the cost (including unofficial cost) and quality of treatment upon which he 
makes his decision. 
Figure 4 provides the perceptions of the degree of corruption in various bodies and sectors from the 
perspective of households, enterprises, and public officials.  The data suggest broad agreement between all 
three sample groups that corruption is widespread in the health system, the justice sytem, customs, the 
National Property Fund, and the police.  While household respondents generally perceive the levels of 
corruption to be somewhat higher than enterprise managers and public officials, the responses of public 
officials and enterprise managers also suggest the perception of widespread corruption – half of all public 
officials surveyed reported that corruption is “very widespread” in the health sector, and half of enterprise 
managers said the same of the justice system.16  Even the media does not emerge unscathed: 20 percent of 
public officials and 20 percent of enterprise managers believe corruption is widespread in the public media. 
                                                          
16 The question was: “In your opinion, does corruption exist in the following fields in Slovakia?  If so, tell us how 
widespread corruption is? 1=corruption does not exist in the field, 2=corruption does exist in this field, but it is not very 
widespread, 3=corruption is very widespread in this field, 4=corruption does exist in this field, but I cannot tell how 
widespread it is, 5=I don’t know whether corruption exists in this field.”  The bar chart in Figure 5 presents the absolute 
percentage of respondents that answered “3” to this question.  (I.e., responses of 4 and 5 were not dropped before 
computing the percentages.) 
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Figure 4. Perceptions of Corruption 
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 Experiences 
 
Agencies that Enterprises Contact 
 
This section will examine the frequency with which various bodies require unofficial payments from 
enterprises, the size of the unofficial payments, and an assessment of the quality of services provided.  
Frequency of the Need for Providing Gifts and Bribes 
 
In the enterprise survey, managers were asked how many times they had visited each of 26 different bodies, 
most of them state agencies but including state-owned utilities, banks and notaries, as well.  Respondents 
were also asked on how many visits it was made known to them that they should pay a bribe or that they 
felt before-hand that they must pay a bribe.  
Figure 6 shows the percentage of enterprises that said that a bribe was indicated (of those that actually 
interacted with the agency).  Topping the list17 are customs, import and export licensing, the Certification 
Authority, construction permits, and State Business Supervision.  Not far behind were other licenses, 
telecommunications, and the courts.  
Since firms may interact with some agencies many times, and others only occasionally, it is also 
worthwhile to calculate the percentage of enterprise-visits at which a bribe was indicated.  (See Figure 5.)  
Customs no longer holds the dubious top slot, reflecting the frequency with which firms interact with 
customs.  Based on the “enterprise-visit” criteria, bribes were indicated most frequently when seeking 
construction permits, getting import and export licenses, dealing with State Business Supervision and the 
Certification Authority. 
All of the information presented in Figures 5 and 6 reflect only those enterprises that actually come into 
contact with the given agencies.  This approach is useful for identifying the levels of corruption in the 
interactions that the agencies must have with the enterprises.  But for considering the total impact on the 
enterprise sector, it is also important to consider the proportion of enterprises that must deal with a given 
agency.  When assessing the impact of corruption on the economy, an important question is what 
percentage of all enterprises encountered bribery at the institution, not just the percentage of enterprises 
with contact.  There were three agencies/services for which over 10 percent of all enterprises indicated that 
they had encountered bribery: customs, import and export licenses, and telecommunications.  Although 
“only” 18 percent of the enterprises that had interacted with telecommunications in the previous twelve 
months had encountered bribery, placing it toward the middle of Figures 5 and 6, the fact that so many 
enterprises (over 70 percent) had been in contact makes this sector one with broad impact for the economy. 
                                                          
17 Managers were also asked about the traffic police and vehicle registrations, but these will be discussed in the context 
of the household survey. 
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Figure 5. Percent of Enterprise-Visits at 
Which Bribe was Suggested 
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Quality Ratings 
 
For each agency that an enterprise contacted, a rating of quality was provided by the enterprise manager.  
The ratings of quality are provided in Figure 7.  Not surprisingly, the ratings of quality are highly correlated 
with the degree of bribery encountered at the institutions.  The courts received the lowest rating of quality 
by enterprises, followed by customs, export/import licenses, and the certification authority, all bodies that 
were identified as frequent recipients of bribes. 
 
Figure 7. Ratings of Quality by Enterprises 
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 Size of Bribes Reported by Enterprises 
 
The bribes reported by enterprises in the survey ranged from 40 to 500,000 SK, with the largest bribes 
being paid in the areas of banking services, import and export licenses, courts, telecommunications and 
customs.  The courts and banking services were the recipients of the highest average bribes and the highest 
median bribes. 
 
Table 2.  The Size of Bribes Encountered by Enterprises  
N median average min max
Courts    8  11,250  25,500   1,000   100,000 
Banking Services  15   10,000  63,155      120   500,000 
Business Registry  17    6,500    6,629        40     22,500 
Water, Gas, Electricity  15    5,000    9,107      100     50,000 
Import and Export Licenses  25    5,000  14,184      100   190,000 
Construction Permissions  15    5,000    7,533      500     30,000 
Environmental Protection    9    5,000    3,213      120     10,000 
Other Licenses  12    3,500    7,875      500     50,000 
Business Authority  10    3,500    3,412      120     10,000 
Fire Supervision    9    3,000    2,331      180       5,000 
Telecommunications  31    2,000    7,539      100   100,000 
State Business Supervision  15    2,000    3,513      200     10,000 
Tax Supervision/Authority  21    2,000    5,683      150     20,000 
Labor Security Authority  11    2,000    2,965      120     10,000 
Certification Authority  17    2,000    5,965      400     50,000 
Hygiene Supervision    5     1,000    1,480      100       3,000 
Customs offices  36    1,000    5,795      100   100,000 
Notary Offices    7    1,000    4,429   1,000     15,000 
Health/Social Insurance     5       500    1,430      150       5,000 
Labor Office    5       500    1,304      120       5,000 
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 Figure 8. Summary of Enterprise Experiences with Corruption 
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 Obstacles to Doing Business 
 
Corruption is but one of the problems that enterprises encounter.  To put corruption in perspective, we 
asked enterprises to evaluate how severe each of several factors are as obstacles to doing business.  The 
results, presented in Figure 9, highlight several problems that are commonly heard around the world, such 
as tax rates and lack of credit.  Most notable from Figure 9 are the prominent positions of “slow courts” and 
“low execution of justice” as problems doing business.  Bureaucracy and several factors related to 
corruption were also mentioned as problems by many enterprises.  
Figure 9. Obstacles to Doing Business 
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 Agencies that Households Contact 
 
The household questionnaires included detailed questions on sectors that are likely to be the most important 
from the household perspective:  health, education, and police protection.  A supplemental section inquired 
about other agencies that households interact with less frequently (such as the cadastre, the labor office, 
etc.), providing information on frequency of bribery and quality of services.  This section of the report will 
summarize the household 
experience in terms of the 
frequency of bribe 
payments, the size of 
bribes (health, education, 
and police only), and the 
quality of services 
provided. 
Figure 10. Percent of Time Households Pay Pozornost 
(of those that interacted with the agency) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Labor Office (Employment)
Police (Identity Card)
Police (Driving License)
Labor Office (Benefits)
Police (Investigations)
Police (Passport)
Emergency
Telecom (Line Installation/Repair)
Vocational Schools
Secondary Schools
Primary Schools
Other
Cadastral Printouts
Cadastral Registrations
Medical Practitioner
Savings Banks
Water (Connection/Repair)
Gas (Installation/Repair)
Dentist
Electricity (Connection/Repair)
Vehicle Registration*
Universities
Judiciary
Traffic Police*
Medical Specialist
Hospital
non-voluntary
voluntary
"Voluntary" means that pozornost was paid but the respondent said that he or she wanted to give it; "non-
voluntary" means that pozornost was paid either because they just knew that "this is the way it goes", or 
because the official required it.
*Note: for traffic police and vehicle registrations it is impossible to know if the pozornost was voluntary or 
involuntary.
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 Frequency of Payments of Pozornost 
 
In the household survey, respondents were asked about their most recent experiences (within the past two 
years) with the health system, educational institutions, and the police (criminal investigations), and about 
important experiences with several other bodies such as the cadastre, the labor office, savings banks, etc.  
Figure 10 shows the percentage of interactions with each institution in which some pozornost was paid.  
Hospitals top this list, with nearly 60 percent of respondents reporting that they provided some pozornost 
when a household member was in the hospital.  (Even after dropping cases where the pozornost was 
completely voluntary, households were more likely to make unofficial payments at hospital visits than for 
any of the other state bodies and agencies.)  Medical specialists, the judiciary, the traffic police and 
universities were also indicated as frequent bribe recipients.   
It is worth noting that these experiences correspond closely with the household perceptions reported earlier.  
(See Figure 5.)   The experiences reported in the survey parallel the perception that corruption is 
widespread in the health sector, the judiciary, and the police.18  Similarly, the perception that corruption is 
less widespread in the labor office is supported by the fact that only a small percentage of households that 
contacted the labor office paid a bribe. 
 
Size of Pozornost for Health, Education, and Police Protection 
 
The sizes of pozornost ranged from 20 SK to 100,000 SK.  Hospitals and universities, both cited as 
frequent recipients of pozornost, are also the recipients of the largest value pozornost.  While many were 
“small” it should be kept in mind that with repeated interactions, even small payments can be very costly 
for poor households.  This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Table 3.  The Size of Pozornost Encountered by Households 
      – Health and Education only  
N median average min max
Medical Practitioner 71 100 227 20 1,000
Medical Specialist 59 300 806 20 5,000
Dentist 27 300 463 30 2,500
Hospital Stays 38 500 3,665 50 100,000
Primary School 27 150 788 35 5,000
Vocational School 4 200 875 100 3,000
Secondary School 12 750 2,358 100 15,000
University 10 2,050 6,860 500 50,000
 
                                                          
18 Experiences with the police vary greatly.  While the traffic police are frequent recipients of bribes, far fewer bribes 
were reported for criminal investigations, and provision of ID cards, passports, and driving licenses. 
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Satisfaction Ratings by Households  
 
Households that had contact with governmental bodies were asked to assess their overall level of 
satisfaction, and the results are presented in Figure 11.  Most people were satisfied with their experiences at 
most agencies, although every agency had at least 25 percent who were not satisfied.  The satisfaction 
ratings are not strongly correlated with the levels of pozornost, due mostly to the very low satisfaction 
ratings provided for the labor office (which is not a frequent recipient of pozornost), and mediocre 
satisfaction ratings for hospital visits (which is the most frequent recipient of pozornost). 
 
Figure 11. Satisfaction Ratings 
20% 40% 60% 80%
Labor Office (Employment)
Labor Office (Benefits)
Other Savings Bank (Loan)
Other
Water (Connection/Repair)
Construction Savings Bank (Loan)
Cadastral Registrations
Cadastral Printouts
Emergency
Medical Practitioner
Hospital
Telecom (Line Installation/Repair)
Electricity (Connection/Repair)
Medical Specialist
Police (Driving License)
Police (Passport)
Police (Identity Card)
Dentist
Gas (Installation/Repair)
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 Who Encounters Corruption Most Often? 
 
An understanding of the incidence of corruption provides insight into the way corruption works and how it 
is affecting the economy and society.  In some ways, one can not pinpoint who is most affected since 
corruption affects everyone.  Certain well-known effects of corruption – the erosion of credibility in the 
institutions of state and weakening of the business environment – clearly have an impact on everyone, 
regardless of whether or not they have personally encountered corruption.  If state resources are 
inappropriately diverted or wasted through corrupt procurements, society loses the resources and ends up 
with sub-standard facilities or equipment.  If bribes are paid to evade health regulations or obtain 
construction permits, society may suffer an unnecessary threat to their health and safety.  If a perception of 
corruption causes the public to view court rulings as biased, people may settle disputes in ways outside of 
the scope of the law. 
While the impact of corruption on society is clearly much greater than the impact on those who encounter 
it, an examination of the groups of people and businesses that encounter it most provides insight into how 
corruption is affecting society.  Although understanding who encounters corruption most often is useful, it 
must be kept in mind that the results can be interpreted in many ways.  One can not infer, for example, that 
since one group of people paid bribes more than another group that they are more “corrupt,”  since it is also 
possible that they were forced to pay bribes more frequently, or simply were more likely to encounter 
situations in which bribes would be necessary. In this section, we will explore how experiences with 
corruption vary by region and by characteristic of respondents. 
Regional Variations 
 
Table 4 shows how often households and enterprises in each of the eight regions of Slovakia encountered 
unofficial payments.  Firms in Bratislava were the most likely to have made unofficial payments, and firms 
in Trencín were the least likely.  From the household perspective, the practice of paying unofficially was 
more evenly spread across regions – no region stands out as the worst; households in Zilina and Trnava 
were somewhat less likely to have paid bribes than in other regions.  However, most of the statistics 
presented in Table 4 are not statistically different from one region to the next, and focusing on differences 
between regions distract from the more important message that households and enterprises in every region 
of the country make unofficial payments. 
Table 4. Regional Variations 
 Households Enterprises 
 Percent that made 
unofficial 
payment in past 2 
months 
Percent that made 
unofficial 
payment in past 3 
years 
Percent that made 
unofficial 
payment in past 2 
months 
Percent that made 
unofficial 
payment in past 3 
years 
1.Bratislava 17.0 41.8 24.4 61.8 
2.Trnava 10.8 33.6 10.0 28.1 
3.Trencín 15.0 37.8 5.7 20.6 
4.Nitra 18.4 49.0 17.5 27.4 
5.Žilina 8.4 35.7 12.2 32.7 
6.Banská Bystrica 14.1 43.3 16.2 55.6 
7.Prešov 17.2 38.5 16.7 40.0 
8.Košice 13.7 48.7 15.0 38.5 
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Enterprise Characteristics 
 
The data from the enterprise surveys shows that unofficial payments are made in all regions of the country, 
by firms in all sectors.  Differences in the rate of bribery for privatized versus non-privatized and for new 
versus old firms are not statistically significant.  Similarly, shareholding and limited liability companies 
both encounter bribery at similar rates.  There are, however, some enterprise characteristics that are 
associated with greater or lesser levels of bribery.  Firms in construction, industry, and agriculture and 
forestry were slightly more likely than firms in other sectors to have paid bribes.  Unlike some other 
studies19, medium and large firms are actually somewhat more likely to have paid bribes than smaller firms: 
15 percent of small firms had paid a bribe in the previous two months, compared to 22 percent of medium 
and large firms.20  Firms that are members of business associations were much more likely to have paid 
bribes than firms that are not members in the two months before the survey (24 percent versus 15 percent), 
and in the three years before the survey (57 percent versus 35 percent).21  The statistical importance of 
membership in business association becomes even stronger when controlling for all other enterprise 
characteristics.22  It is important to note that this result does not suggest that such associations are in any 
way bad – on the contrary, some current research suggests that business association play a valuable role in 
reducing corruption as they serve as intermediaries between firms and the state.   
The data show a very strong association between unofficial payments and firm growth and investment.  
Firms that grew faster in the three years prior to the survey were more likely than slower growing 
enterprises to have made unofficial payments in those same three years.  Likewise, firms that were 
forecasting faster future growth were more likely to have made unofficial payments in the previous 3 years 
and in the previous 2 months.23  This “growth effect” is mirrored for investment.  Firms that had made 
major investments were more likely to have bribed, and those that were planning major investments were 
also more likely to have bribed.24 
These results do not suggest that unofficial payments are useful for growth or investment.  It is more likely 
that growing firms simply have more interactions with state bodies and agencies, getting more licenses and 
permits, facing more inspections, and so forth, than do firms that are not growing.  In fact, after controlling 
for differences in the frequency that firms interact with the state, both the growth and investment effects 
disappear.  Responses to other survey questions also refute the idea that bribery is useful.  Even the fastest 
growing firms described corruption as a very serious obstacle to business development, and firms that have 
paid bribes describe corruption as more serious an obstacle than do their counterparts that did not pay 
bribes, a fact that is true for growing firms and shrinking firms alike.  Rather than being useful for growth, 
the corruption faced by enterprises hinders them from growing to their full potential. 
                                                          
19 For example, EBRD Transition Report 1999 found that small firms made unofficial payments more frequently than 
larger firms. 
20 Small firms were those with less than 15 full-time employees.  Thirty-seven percent of small firms had made an 
unofficial payment over the three years before the survey, compared to 47 percent of medium and large firms.  These 
differences are significant in pairwise t-tests at the 15 and 10 percent levels, for the 2 month and 3 year horizons, 
respectively. 
21 These differences are statistically significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels in pairwise t-tests. 
22 Probit regressions were run with dummies for paying bribes over the previous two months and three years as the 
dependent variables, with size, age, business association membership, sector, region dummies plus dummies for contact 
each of 26 state agencies on the right hand side.  Membership in business associations remained significant at the 1 
percent level. 
23 Significant at the 10 percent level in pairwise t-tests. 
24 In the two months before the survey, 24 percent of firms that had made recent major investments said they had made 
unofficial payments, compared to 14 percent for firms that had not invested.  Similarly, 21 percent of firms planning a 
major investment had made an unofficial payment, versus 12 of firms that are not planning a major investment.  Both 
results are significant at the 10 percent. 
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Household Characteristics 
 
Households with certain characteristics are significantly more likely to have made unofficial payments.  
Those with higher income are significantly more likely to have made unofficial payments in the previous 
three years, as are households that engage in business activities.  Respondents with driver’s licenses are 
more likely to have made unofficial payments, consistent with the finding that payments to traffic police 
are common.  Older respondents are more likely to have made unofficial payments than younger 
respondents, and female respondents were more likely to have made unofficial payments than male 
respondents.  Those with higher levels of education are more likely to have made unofficial payments than 
those with lower levels of education, although this seems to be generated by the fact that those with higher 
levels of education generally have higher income, are likely to be drivers, and have more contact with 
public officials.25 
The fact that richer households seem more likely to have made unofficial payments, even after controlling 
for the fact that wealthier households are more likely to contact various agencies26, illustrates that richer 
households may be able to buy their way out of difficulties that poorer households can not.  Indeed, while 
the household survey data show clearly that wealthier households are more likely to have made unofficial 
payments, the data also show that the impact on poorer households is greater.  The size of the pozornost 
paid in the health sector, for example, is entirely uncorrelated with level of income, implying that the 
payments as a share of income are larger for poorer households.  Consider, for example, the relatively small 
pozornost payments provided for general medical practitioners.  These payments of 20 to 1,000 SK 
represent 0.3 percent to 9 percent of monthly income.  While the median visit to a general practitioner 
represented 1 percent of household income, the poorest third of the population paid an average of 3.6 
percent of an already small monthly income for a visit to the doctor.27  
                                                          
25 Since many of the characteristics are related to each other, probit regressions were performed to find out which 
factors are correlated with the probability of making unofficial payments after controlling for all other factors.  The 
dependent variable was the dummy for having paid a bribe in the previous three years; all of the household and 
respondent characteristics described in this paragraph were on the right hand side.  All were significant at the 5 percent 
level or higher.  After adding dummies for contact with state bodies on the right hand side, education was no longer 
significant, and gender, income, and ownership of business fell to the 10 percent level of significance. 
26 Many “at a glance” tables in this report show that the poorest third of households contacted state agencies at lower 
rates than wealthier households. 
27 Regressing the share of income paid in pozornost for a single visit to a general practitioner on the level of income 
results in a negative coefficient which is significant at the 5 percent level.  These analyses only include cases where the 
respondent could estimate the value of the pozornost. 
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 3. Experiences with Corruption 
 
This section of the report summarizes respondent’s experiences with governmental bodies in terms of 
corruption, the nature of unofficial payments, reasons paid, and the satisfaction levels of clients.    
Social Sectors 
 
Health Sector  
 
The one state sector that arguably touches the largest portion of the population is the health sector – over 80 
percent of the households in our survey had visited a medical facility in the previous two years, far 
surpassing any other body.  In the eyes of the public, the health sector is also the one touched with the most 
widespread corruption problem, topping the list (Figure 5) for households and public officials.   
This section of the report presents the responses to the household survey about experiences in the health 
sector.  Respondents were asked about their three most recent experiences with the health sector, 
identifying whether the visit was to a general medical practitioner, specialist, dentist, hospital stay, or 
emergency treatment.  Since respondents were asked about specific visits, their answers are very clearly 
based on actual experiences, and since a single household could report on up to three visits, evaluations 
were provided for over 1,700 visits to medical facilities. Nearly half of the medical visits were to general 
practitioners, followed by medical specialists, and dentists.  (See Table 5.)  There were many fewer 
interactions with hospital stays and emergency treatment.28  Since respondents could provide answers for 
either state or private facilities, it is possible to compare responses for each type – these comparisons will 
make clear that unofficial payments are widespread in private facilities as well as those run by the state. 
Table 5.  Of those visiting medical facility, percentage visiting 
  
General practitioner 47.7 
Medical specialist 24.7 
Dentist 17.5 
Stay in hospital 6.9 
Emergency 3.3 
 
 
Ratings of Quality 
 
For each visit to a medical facility, respondents were asked to provide a rating of the quality of the staff, the 
facility, and the length of waiting time.  Ratings went from 1 to 5, where 1 and 2 indicate satisfaction, and 4 
and 5 indicate dissatisfaction.  Overall, responses leaned towards satisfaction, as the means were always 
under 3.  (See Table 6.) 
People were generally least satisfied with the length of waiting time, except for hospital stays, in which 
case they were least satisfied with the facilities.  (For emergency care, there was not much difference in the 
levels of satisfaction.)  On the whole, people were least satisfied with emergency treatment and hospital 
stays, the two types of medical visits for which there is virtually no private sector alternative. In evaluating 
                                                          
28 The sample size is large enough that one can still make meaningful evaluations of hospital stays and emergency 
treatment  (e.g., the 3.3 percent of visits for emergency treatment still constitutes 56 observations). 
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the care of staff, people were least satisfied with emergency room and hospital staff, most satisfied with 
dentists and specialists. In terms of the length of waiting time, people were least satisfied with emergency 
room visits and general medical practitioners.  People were least satisfied with the facilities for emergency 
room visits and for stays in the hospital. 
Table 6.  Ratings of Dissatisfaction 
(higher numbers mean more dissatisfied) 
 Care of Staff Length of 
Waiting Time
Facilities 
General practitioner 2.02 2.80 2.27 
Medical specialist 1.85 2.42 2.09 
Dentist 1.81 2.20 1.82 
Stay in hospital 2.34 2.36 2.66 
Emergency 2.55 2.63 2.66 
 
Comparing responses for state and private facilities reveals that satisfaction was higher for the care of staff 
at private general practitioners and private dentists than for their state counterparts. There was no real 
difference in the staff quality ratings for state and private specialists. 
Table 7.  Ratings of Dissatisfaction 
(higher numbers mean more dissatisfied) 
 Care of Staff Length of Waiting 
Time 
Facilities 
 State Private State Private State Private 
General practitioner 2.13 1.85 2.93 2.58 2.37 2.15 
Medical specialist 1.83 1.83 2.50 2.21 2.11 2.01 
Dentist 2.01 1.70 2.28 2.15 2.03 1.70 
Stay in hospital 2.38 NA 2.37 NA 2.71 NA 
Emergency 2.58 NA 2.27 NA 2.74 NA 
Note: There are only three observations each for private hospital stays and emergencies.  For this 
reason, NA will be used for these services throughout. 
 
For length of waiting time, people were equally satisfied with state and private dentists, but preferred 
private practitioners and specialists over their state counterparts.  Private facilities generally received better 
facilities quality ratings than state counterparts. 
Pozornost – Bribe Paying and Gift Giving in the Slovak Health Sector 
 
By far, the type of service for which some 
pozornost is paid most often is for hospital 
stays.  Nearly six out of ten respondents 
who stayed in the hospital paid some 
attention, and most of them said it was not 
just a voluntary expression of gratitude.  
Thankfully, pozornost is not paid 
frequently for emergency situations. For 
private and state facilities alike, people 
paid some attention more often for medical 
specialists than they did for general 
practitioners, or dentists. 
The gifts, counter services, and money provided by patients
to health care providers, pozornost, are in some instances
similar to bribes, for example when the patient feels it is
necessary to receive proper care, and in some instances
merely a small token of gratitude.  Since there is no
objective dividing line between acceptable gifts and
unacceptable bribes, this and following sections of the report
will simply report on pozornost – in most cases statistics will
be provided to indicate the proportion of cases for which the
pozornost was voluntary or involuntary, and whether the
payer felt it was just an expression of gratitude or a way of
ensuring proper care.  Revising ethics guidelines for staff in
the health sector (and others) to clearly delineate acceptable
gifts from unacceptable gifts should be an important
component of public sector reforms for fighting corruption. 
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Table 8.  Percentage Paying Some Pozornost 
 Overall State facility Private facility 
General practitioner 15.8 15.0 17.8 
Medical specialist 29.5 31.0 27.0 
Dentist 18.2 18.7 18.1 
Stay in hospital 58.6 58.2 NA 
Emergency 5.4 5.8 NA 
Note: some respondents did not know whether they had visited a state of private facility, 
explaining why the overall and state percentage of visits at which pozornost was paid differ.  
 
Types of Pozornost 
 
For each interaction with a medical facility, respondents were asked whether attention was paid and 
whether it was paid in the form of a gift, a counter service, or money.  The responses are summarized in 
Table 9. 
 
Table 9.  Percentage Paying Attention in Form of … 
 
 Gift Counter-service Money 
General practitioner 11.3 2.7 3.7 
Medical specialist 22.3 4.5 7.8 
Dentist 12.8 3.4 6.7 
Stay in hospital 41.4 5.2 29.3 
Emergency 1.8 0.0 3.6 
Notes: These are overall frequencies from the whole sample of people who visited a practitioner.  
It is not restricted to those who paid bribes.  Also, some respondents gave combinations of various 
forms of attention (e.g., gift and money), and for this reason the rows add up to more than the 
total percentage of people giving some attention. 
 
Four of ten respondents who visited the hospital left some gift, and one in five who visited a specialist left 
some gift. Gift-giving for state and private facilities were on the same scale, except in the case of 
specialists.  Respondents who visited state medical specialists were much more likely to give a gift than 
those who visited a private specialist. Three in ten respondents who visited the hospital paid pozornost in 
the form of cash.  It is also clear from Table 10 that cash is used for private medical practitioners, 
specialists and dentists, as well as public. 
Table 10. Percentage Paying Pozornost in Form of … 
 Gift Counter service Money 
 State Private State Private State Private 
General practitioner 11.1 12.4 2.5 3.4 3.5 4.0 
Medical specialist 25.5 16.5 4.1 6.1 6.8 9.6 
Dentist 12.1 13.3 6.5 1.6 6.5 6.9 
Stay in hospital 40.9 NA 5.5 NA 28.2 NA 
Emergency 1.9 NA 0.0 NA 3.8 NA 
 
 
Is the Pozornost Completely Voluntary, Assumed to be Necessary, or Demanded by the Medical Staff? 
 
The household questionnaire asked respondents who paid pozornost for a medical visit whether it was 
required, assumed to be necessary, or completely voluntary.  Forty-three percent said that “nobody required 
it – just wanted to give it”, 52 percent said that “nobody required it, but this is just the way it goes”, and 5 
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percent said it was “required by the medical workers”.  Hospitals, by far the type of facility at which 
respondent were most likely to have paid some attention, were also the type of facility for which the 
attention was least likely to be voluntary.  (See Figure 12.) 
Figure 12.  Medical Pozornost: Voluntary, Assumed, or Required? 
General Practitioner
required
assumed
voluntary
Medical Specialist
required
assumed
voluntary
Dentists
required
assumed
voluntary
Hospitals
required
assumed
voluntary
 
   
There is a sharp dichotomy between the reasons for paying pozornost to state and private practitioners. For 
general practitioners and dentists, those visiting private practitioners were much more likely to be making 
the payments voluntarily, while those visiting state practitioners were more likely to either be required to 
pay or to just figure that this is the way it goes.  By contrast, for medical specialists, respondents visiting 
private practitioners were more likely to report that “this is just the way it goes”.   
 
Size of Pozornost 
 
Overall, 27 percent of respondents who admitted paying some attention for medical visits refused to answer 
when asked for the amount.29 It is reasonable to assume that these were likely to be the larger amounts, in 
which case estimates of the size of the bribes would be biased downward.  Indeed, the refusal rates were 
highest for hospital stays and for medical specialists, the two types of practitioners with the highest value 
“attention.”  (See Table 11.) 
. 
Table 11.  Size of Pozornost 
 Average Median Min Max N Percent 
refusals 
Overall 1110 200 20 100,000 197 27.4 
General practitioner 227 100 20 1,000 71 20.5 
Medical specialist 806 300 20 5,000 59 29.8 
Dentist 463 300 30 2,500 27 29.6 
Stay in hospital 3665 500 50 100,000 38 35.3 
All amounts in SK. 
 
 
Reason for Pozornost 
 
Respondents were asked to describe the specific reasons for paying the pozornost, and their open-ended 
responses are categorized and summarized in Table 12.  Most responded that they paid the attention to 
improve quality or to express thankfulness.  It should be noted that while many said the attention was paid 
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29The questionnaires made it possible to distinguish between refusals and answers of “I don’t know”. 
to express thanks, the fact that the health sector is perceived to be the most corrupt suggests that people 
view their pozornost payments, however voluntary they may be, as “corruption” nevertheless. 
When developing an anticorruption strategy for the health sector, it will be important to address the entire 
system, beginning with the medical universities.  As discussed below, bribes seem to be routinely paid for 
admittance to medical school, a practice which sets a bad tone for those entering the medical profession.  
(See Table 22.) 
 
Table 12.  If paid pozornost what was the reason? 
 Overal
l 
General 
Practitione
r 
Medical 
Specialis
t 
Dentist Stay in 
Hospital 
Improve quality of health care 34.6 22.4 41.6 33.3 41.3 
To get better prescription 
drugs 
5.7 8.4 8.8 0.0 0.0 
To be favored—to speed up 
the examination 
10.8 11.2 10.6 15.7 6.9 
To express my thankfulness 32.5 38.3 28.3 29.4 32.8 
It is a habit, it is common 10.5 10.3 8.8 9.8 15.5 
Other  5.7 9.3 1.8 11.8 1.7 
 
 
 
Education  
 
Like the health sector, the education sector touches nearly every Slovak at some point. Over forty percent 
of the households that responded to the survey had at least one member in primary, secondary, or 
vocational schools or universities.  Nearly all of the students (95 percent) attended state-run institutions, 
with the remainder attending church- or private-run institutions. 
Satisfaction with the Quality of Staff and Facilities 
 
For every level of schooling, households with students report greater satisfaction with teachers and 
educators than they do with facilities. On average, households with students reported being somewhat 
satisfied with the quality of teachers and educators, and there is little difference between the responses for 
the different levels of schooling.  Satisfaction ratings were higher for church-run schools than for state-run 
schools. 
With regard to facilities, there was a marked difference between the quality ratings for primary schools on 
the one hand, and vocational and secondary schools on the other hand—respondents were much less 
satisfied with the quality of primary school facilities.  Ratings for church and private schools were higher 
than those of state schools. 
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Table 13.  Ratings of Satisfaction of Educational Institutions 
 N Percent satisfied with the quality 
of teachers and educators 
Percent satisfied with 
the quality of facilities 
Overall 702 65.3 40.3 
Primary schools 367 65.3 31.3 
Vocational schools 72 68.5 51.4 
Secondary schools 193 65.8 52.3 
Universities 70 60.8 42.9 
Includes only the opinions of households with at least one member at that level school in the previous 
term.  Households with satisfaction ratings of 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 were classified as “satisfied.” 
 
Respondents were also asked about the trends in quality.  On average respondents reported little or no 
change in the quality of schooling at any level over the past three years.  Of the households with students at 
each level of school, slightly more thought the quality of vocational, secondary, and university schools had 
improved than thought the quality had declined, but the plurality of respondents reported no change.   At 
the primary school level, slightly more thought quality had deteriorated than thought it had improved, but 
again, the plurality of respondents reported no change.  
Pozornost – Bribe Paying and Gift Giving in the Slovak Education Sector 
 
Unofficial payments in the education sector are much less common than in the health sector, though they 
are by no means uncommon.30  For every eight students enrolled in an educational institution in the 
previous term, one reported paying some pozornost.  This statistic, however, masks the great diversity of 
experience across different levels of schooling.  Twenty-two percent of households with university students 
paid some attention, while only 10-12 percent at other levels paid “attention.”  
Table 14.  Paying Pozornost at Educational Institutions 
 N Percent reporting paying some pozornost the previous term 
Overall 701 12.7 
Primary schools 366 12.6 
Vocational schools 71 9.9 
Secondary schools 194 10.3 
Universities 70 22.9 
Includes only the experiences of households with at least one member at that level school in the 
previous term. 
 
The perceived trend in bribe paying varies tremendously in the education sector. At the primary level, 48 
percent of respondents reported that there “was and is no bribery at all”31 – 11 percent reported an increase 
in bribery, and 3 percent reported a decrease in bribery.  By contrast, less than 2 percent of respondents at 
the university level reported there “was and is no bribery at all”, less than 2 percent reported a decrease in 
bribery, and 82 percent reported that bribery had increased.  (Half said bribery had increased immensely.) 
Types of Pozornost in the Education Sector 
 
The most prevalent form of pozornost came in the form of gifts: of those that paid some pozornost, 73 
percent gave attention in the form of a gift, whereas only 24 and 21 percent provided counter service or 
paid cash, respectively.  (The sum is greater than 100 because, for example, a student could have given 
both a gift and cash, a common occurrence at the university level.)  Again, however, the experience is quite 
                                                          
30 For an analysis of the reasons for bribery in the health and education sectors, see Faces of Corruption. 
31 After dropping responses of “I don’t know.” 
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different for the different levels of education.  As Table 15 makes clear, cash payments were much more 
common at the university level, while gifts were the norm at lower levels.  
Table 15.  Types of  Pozornost paid at Educational Institutions 
 N proportion of 
students giving 
Gifts 
proportion of 
students giving 
Counter-Service 
Proportion of 
students giving 
Money 
Overall 701 9.3 3.0 2.7 
Primary schools 366 10.9 2.7 0.8 
Vocational schools 71 7.0 1.4 1.4 
Secondary schools 194 6.2 2.6 3.1 
Universities 70 11.4 7.1 12.9 
Includes only the experiences of households with at least one member at that level school in the 
previous term. 
 
Is the Pozornost Completely Voluntary, Assumed to be Necessary, or Demanded by the Educational 
Staff? 
 
Roughly one out of five households that paid attention reported that it was required by the school workers, 
while nearly half reported giving the attention freely; the remaining 30 percent reported that “nobody 
required it, but I know this is the way it goes.”  Consistent with the theme of the earlier sections, university 
students were the least likely to give voluntarily, and the most likely to give because it was required. 
(Figure 13).  Moreover, the data make clear that gifts are more likely to be voluntary and attention in the 
form of money is more likely to have been demanded by the school staff—over half of the respondents who 
gave money reported that it was required of the officials. (Table 16). 
Figure 13. Educational Pozornost: Voluntary, Assumed, or Required? 
Primary Schools
required
assumed
voluntary
Vocational Schools
required
assumed
voluntary
Secondary Schools
required
assumed
voluntary
Universities
required
assumed
voluntary
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 Table 16.  Types of  Pozornost and Who Initiated in the Education Sector 
  Among the respondents who paid some pozornost, the 
percent who indicated that: 
 N “nobody required 
it—I just wanted 
to give it” 
“nobody required 
it, but I know this 
is the way it goes” 
“the school 
workers required 
it” 
Overall 89 48.3 32.6 19.1 
Gift only 59 59.3 32.2 8.5 
Counter-service only 11 45.5 36.4 18.2 
Money only 11 9.1 45.5 45.5 
Money plus Gift or 
Counter-service 
8 25.0 12.5 62.5 
Includes only the experiences of households that reported paying some attention at that level school 
in the previous term. 
 
Reasons for Paying Pozornost 
 
Respondents were asked in an open-ended question why they had paid some attention.  Most of the people 
who had paid said they did so to gain some benefits for the child, or simply because it is a routine part of 
the educational process.  (See Table 17.)  At the primary level, attention was less likely to be paid for the 
purposes of helping the child than for the other levels of  schooling – only 13 percent of the primary school 
attendees that paid attention did so to help the student, whereas 56 to 75 percent of those paying attention at 
the secondary and university level did so to help the students.  Similarly, those giving money were much 
more likely to be doing so to gain benefits for the student than those who merely gave gifts.  (See Table 
18.) 
Table 17.  Reasons for Paying Pozornost in the Education Sector 
  Among the respondents who paid some pozornost, the percent 
who described the reason as: 
 N advantages 
for the 
student 
sponsorship 
of school 
Express 
thankfulnes
s 
routine Other 
Overall 71 35.2 19.7 9.9 26.8 8.5 
Primary schools 38 13.2 28.9 13.2 36.8 7.9 
Vocational schools 5 40.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 
Secondary schools 16 56.3 18.8 0.0 12.5 12.5 
Universities 12 75.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 8.3 
Includes only the experiences of households that reported paying some attention at that level school 
in the previous term.  The responses from an open-ended question were categorized into one of the 
five column headings. 
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Table 18.  Reasons for Paying Pozornost in the Education Sector, by Types 
  Among the respondents who paid some pozornost, the percent 
who described the reason as: 
 N advantages 
for the 
student 
sponsorship 
of school 
Express 
thankfulnes
s 
routine other 
Overall 71 35.2 19.7 9.9 26.8 8.5 
Gift only 49 22.4 16.3 14.3 36.7 10.2 
Counter-service only 5 60.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 
Money only 9 77.8 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Money plus Gift or 
Counter-service 
8 50.0 37.5 0.0 37.5 37.5 
Includes only the experiences of households that reported paying some attention at that level school in 
the previous term.  The responses from an open-ended question were categorized into one of the five 
column headings. 
 
What Causes Bribery of School Workers? 
 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the reasons that bribery of school workers exists.  The responses, 
presented in Table 19, suggest that the most important reason is to gain admittance to the school, with over 
three fourths of households reporting claiming this to be “very often a reason” for bribery of school 
workers.  Nearly half also report that bribes take place to get better grades.  Many respondents also gave 
credence to the idea that bribes are an expression of thankfulness, or a matter of routine.  Few respondents 
believed that bribes are paid due to low salaries or low budgets for the education sector.32 
 
                                                          
32 Respondents who work in the education sector were slightly more likely to respond that low salaries and budget are 
the cause of bribery, but the difference is not tremendous: only 9 percent said low salaries were “very often a reason”, 
while 41 percent low salaries were “very rarely a reason” for bribery of school workers. 
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Table 19.  Reasons Bribes are Paid to School Workers 
 Among the respondents who paid some pozornost, the 
percent who described the reason as: 
 Very often 
a reason 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Very rare 
reason 
5 
to get the child to the school 
 
80.6 13.5 4.0 0.6 1.3 
to get better grades 21.3 27.1 30.3 14.3 7.0 
because the school workers request it 
directly or indirectly 
7.2 9.3 30.1 29.2 24.2 
because the teachers are insufficiently 
paid 
5.4 4.9 22.9 24.3 42.5 
because the education has a very low 
budget 
5.6 6.9 17.9 19.0 50.6 
to express their thanks for the teachers 13.6 26.6 25.1 13.4 21.2 
because it is a tradition, it is common 18.5 15.6 31.4 15.1 19.4 
Note: This table includes only the opinions of households with at least one student in school. Responses of “I 
don’t know” were dropped in calculating the table above. 
 
Size of Pozornost in the Education Sector 
 
The size of the bribes paid in the education sector range from 35 SK to 50,000 SK, with a median of 500 
SK.  University students paid the highest bribes by a large margin.  (See Table 20.) 
Table 20.  Size of  Pozornost (SK) at Various Levels of Education  
  Among the respondents who paid some pozornost: 
 N Mean Min Max 
Overall 53 2,296 35 50,000 
Primary schools 27 788 35 5,000 
Vocational schools 4 875 100 3,000 
Secondary schools 12 2,358 100 15,000 
Universities 10 6,860 500 50,000 
Includes only the experiences of households that reported paying some attention at that level school 
in the previous term. 
 
Predictably, those who gave money were the most likely to refuse to answer the question (16 percent versus 
9 percent for those who gave a gift or counter-service), and those who gave counter-service were the most 
likely to respond that they did not know the value (48 percent versus 24 percent for those who gave a gift or 
money).  Pozornost in the form of gifts are much more likely to be small, averaging about 950 SK, while 
the average value for those paying money and counter-service fell in the 6,000 to 7,000 range.   (See Table 
21.) 
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Table 21.  Size of  Pozornost (SK) and the Reasons for Paying in the Education Sector 
  Among the respondents who paid some pozornost: 
 N Mean Min Max 
Overall 53 2,296 35 50,000 
Gift only 37 702 35 5,000 
Counter-service only 1 700 700 700 
Money only 9 3,000 100 15,000 
Money + Gift or 
Counter-service 
6 11,333 2,000 50,000 
Includes only the experiences of households that reported paying some attention at that level school in the 
previous term. 
 
Bribery for Admittance to Higher Education 
 
The household surveys asked respondents whether they thought it was or was not possible to gain 
admittance to each of seven types of schools.  The results, presented in Table 22, clearly show the 
perception that bribes for admittance to higher education are widespread.  Even when restricting the sample 
to those with household members at universities, and those who work in the education sector – presumably 
these respondents have solid information on which to base their perceptions – around half the respondents 
feel that it is absolutely not possible to gain admittance to medical or law schools without paying bribes.  
Only 14 percent believe it is possible to gain admittance to medical school without bribes, only 10 percent 
for law school.33  (See Figure 14.)  These responses are consistent with the perception – backed up by 
actual experiences – that unofficial payments are common in the health and legal sectors.  The responses 
also show, quite clearly, that an anticorruption strategy for these sectors must take a systemic approach, 
examining the not just the delivery of judicial and health services, but the institutions that train and certify 
professionals, as well. 
 
Table 22. Bribery for Admittance to Higher Education  
 Percentage of respondents who think “it is definitely not possible to 
be accepted without a bribe”  (Responses of 5 on a scale of 1 to 5) 
 Entire Sample Households with 
university students 
Respondents 
working in the 
education sector 
Medicine 55.7 45.3 48.7 
Law 61.2 50.8 56.6 
Economy 30.8 19.4 24.8 
Natural Sciences 16.4 9.4 7.0 
Technology 10.1 4.5 5.4 
Social Sciences 15.0 12.1 9.0 
Artistic 
Universities 
37.6 36.1 26.8 
 
                                                          
33 Based only on the opinions of respondents who work in the education sector. 
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Figure 14.  Bribery for Admittance to Medical and Law Schools 
 
“Is it possible to be admitted to each of the following schools without paying bribes?” 
(Responses of households with at least one member working in the education sector.) 
Medical School
definitely 
possible
possible
maybe 
maybe not 
possible
not possible
definitely 
not possible
Law School
definitely 
possible
possible
maybe 
maybe not 
possible
not possible
definitely 
not possible
 
Labor Office 
 
The labor office serves two functions in 
Slovakia, assisting unemployed people with 
their job search, and providing benefits to the 
unemployed.  Although satisfaction ratings 
were very low, few respondents reported 
paying bribes either for employment help or 
for benefits.  (See Tables 23 and 24.) 
 
 
 Table 23. Labor Office to Find Employment at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 18.7 17.9 19.1 20.2 
NO. VISITS 8.1 10.6 9.4 5.8 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 64.6 66.7 68.9 55.9 
POZORNOST 1.7 3.1 1.9 0.0 
-  NECESSARY 100.0 100.0 100.0 Na 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 30.8 28.1 36.5 35.0 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 24.6 23.3 25.5 25.0 
 Table 24. Unemployment Benefits at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 17.5 18.1 16.1 18.2
NO. VISITS 4.4 7.6 4.3 3.6
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 66.4 78.9 63.2 56.7
POZORNOST 3.2 4.0 4.9 5.7
-  NECESSARY 60.0 100.0 50.0 50.0
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 33.3 20.0 48.8 40.0
OVERALL SATISFACTION 33.1 20.8 39.0 40.0
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Justice System 
 
Courts34 
 
Of all the obstacles that enterprises face in their business development, “slowness of courts” was selected 
by 80 percent of enterprises as one of the three most serious obstacles they face, as many or more than 
selected “high tax rates” or “shortage of loan resources”.  (See Figure 9.)  A further 75 percent of 
enterprises indicated “low executability of justice” to be a major problem. 
More than one in four enterprise had been involved in a court case in the previous twelve months, and 35 
percent had used the courts to settled business disputes in the two years before the survey.  Among these, 
nearly 19 percent indicated that they had encountered bribery.  While the percentage encountering bribery 
was lower than for several regulatory 
bodies, the size of bribes was much 
larger.  The average bribe was over 
25,000 SK,  and the median was over 
11,000 SK, more than any of the other 
20 governmental bodies covered by the 
enterprise survey.  Courts also received 
a dismal quality rating, among the 
worst in the survey.  Only one out of 
nine enterprises that were involved in 
court cases gave favorable ratings for 
quality. 
Table 25. Courts at a Glance: the Enterprise Perspective 
 Overall Small Medium 
and Large
New 
CONTACT 27.3 19.8 48.2 16.3 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 18.9 19.2 18.9 28.6 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 10.4 11.4 9.7 12.2 
BRIBE SIZE 25,500 29,250 21,750 53,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 11.4 11.6 12.6 13.3 
 
Households reported similar experiences with the courts.  Of the 13 percent of households that were 
involved in court trials, 25 percent gave something “special” to a court employee, judge, or attorney.  The 
rate was highest among those who were the accusing parties in civil trials, such as divorces, property 
disputes, etc. – 32 percent made such unofficial payments. 
Enterprises that had been to court in the previous two years were asked to evaluate their experience by 
stating whether they agree or disagree that the procedure was fair and unbaised, free of corruption, and fast.  
Thirty five percent responded that the procedure was unfair or biased, and 30 percent felt is was corrupt.  
The responses to the question about the speed of the proceeding were the most striking – less than 17 
Figure 15.  
Court Proceedings were … 
Fair Unbiased 
Decisions
to ta lly  
agree
21%
rather 
to ta lly  
disagree
7%
Not Corrupt
tota lly  
agree
29%rather 
disagree
tota lly  
disagree
8%
Fast
to ta lly  
agree
4%
rather 
agree
13%
tota lly  
disagree
rather 
disagree
40%
43%
rather 
agree
41%
22%
rather 
agree
44%
disagree
28%
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34 The Business Registry, although handled by the courts, will be discussed in the section on enterprise regulation, 
below. 
percent felt the process was fast and without unnecessary delays.  These responses are consistent with the 
finding described earlier that slowness of courts is a major problem. 
Slowness and inefficiency of courts are problems in themselves, but they are also key causes of corruption. 
Among enterprises that were involved in court proceedings, those that found proceedings to be fast were 
one fourth as likely to report that it was corrupt than those who reported the proceedings to be slow. 
Figure 16.  
Those who found the court proceedings … 
FAST
process 
was corrupt
9%
process 
was not 
corrupt
91%
SLOW
process 
was corrupt
35%
process 
was not 
corrupt
65%
 
  
 
Again, the households survey responses echo the responses of enterprises.  When asked the reason that they 
had made unofficial payments, more than half indicated “to speed up the trial” as the main reason.35  
Seventeen percent said the main reason was to influence the court’s decision, and 12 percent said they gave 
out of gratefulness.  The “time cost” of going to court is also indicated as a key reason that people do not 
appeal to courts even when they have cause to.  Sixty-eight percent of households said that the reason 
people avoid the courts is that the time from filing to completion is too long.  The only reason for avoiding 
courts cited by more respondents was that “official trial fees are too high.”  Slowness and high fees are not 
the only reason people avoid the courts, however.  Forty-three percent of respondents said that people 
frequently avoid the courts because of the necessity to pay bribes. 
By the perception of the households that participated in the survey, the problem of court inefficiency and 
bribery has become worse over the past three years.  Twenty seven percent said that the quality of work in 
the judiciary has worsened, while only 7 percent said it had improved.  Regarding the degree of bribery, the 
responses were even more dismal:  forty-five percent said bribery in the judicial system had worsened, 
while only 2 percent said it had improved. 
 35
                                                          
35 Fifty five percent identified “to speed up the trial” as the main reason, and 65 percent as one of the top three reasons. 
 Police 
 
Investigations of Violent and Property-Related Crimes 
 
One in twelve Slovak households said that a household member had been a victim of a violent crime in the 
previous 3 years; nearly one in four said they had been victims of property-related crimes.  Many of these 
crimes went unreported: 43 percent of violent crimes and 31 percent of property-related crimes were not 
reported to the police.  Of those that were reported to the police, only 21 percent of violent crimes and 16 
percent of property-related crimes were solved, according to respondents.  Of those that did report the 
crimes, few were satisfied with the investigations: 24 percent and 17 percent for violent and property-
related crimes, respectively. (See Table 26.) 
Table 26.  Police Investigations 
 Violent crimes Property-related 
crimes 
Percentage reporting being a victim of a crime 8.3 23.4 
Percentage reporting the crime 57.0 69.1 
Percentage reporting that the criminal was caught 20.8 15.9 
Of those who reported the crime, the percentage satisfied 
with the investigation 
23.5 17.3 
Of those who reported the crime, the percentage that paid 
some attention 
3.8 3.4 
Includes only the opinions of households that were victims of violent, or property-related crime, respectively.  
Households with satisfaction ratings of 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 were classified as “satisfied.” 
 
Although victims of crimes were generally unsatisfied with the investigative efforts of the police, only two 
victims of violent crimes (less than 4 percent), and seven victims of  property-related crime (also less than 4 
percent), reported having paid some pozornost.  Only a single victim of either type of crime reported 
paying money.  (The money was paid during the investigation.)  One victim of a crime reported that the 
police workers required the bribe, the balance saying either that they gave voluntarily, or they “know this is 
the way it goes.” 
Although many of the crimes were not reported to the police, the reasons were usually personal (“the crime 
was not so serious”, or “reporting it would just cause problems”).  However, there were a few cases where 
the respondents reported distrust toward the police, or complicated procedures as motives for keeping quiet.  
Traffic Police 
 
In most countries the traffic police are believed to be frequent recipients of unofficial payments.  The 
power to levy fines or other penalties, in an environment without witnesses, makes it tempting for the 
policeman and a driver to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement.  But rather than the fines flowing 
into the state’s coffers and the driver’s record accurately reflecting offenses, the bribes reside with the 
policemen and there is no public record of a driver’s infractions. 
In Slovakia, the traffic police receive much poorer ratings from the citizenry than do their counterparts in 
criminal investigations and issuing documents.  Of the 388 respondents to the household survey that have 
driver’s licenses and own cars, 37 percent reported that they have paid a bribe to a traffic policeman at least 
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once, and 19 percent said they had done so several times.36  Similarly, entrepreneurs reported that one in 
four times that they encounter the traffic police they end up paying a bribe.  
Police as Issuers of Identity Cards, Passports, and Driving Licenses 
 
In their functions as issuers of identity cards, passports, and driving licenses, the police receive very high 
marks for satisfaction and for the low need for unofficial payments.  (See Tables 27 through 29.)  
Satisfaction ratings are among the highest, and experiences with corruption among the lowest of the bodies 
and services rated by households. 
Table 27. Identity Cards at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 27.1 22.7 29.7 33.9 
NO. VISITS 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 28.6 30.0 24.2 21.8 
POZORNOST 2.2 3.3 0.0 3.4 
-  NECESSARY 80.0 100.0 Na 50.0 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 75.2 80.3 77.9 75.9 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 74.9 83.3 77.9 74.1 
 
 
Table 28. Driving Licenses at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 15.5 10.7 16.4 25.2 
NO. VISITS 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.7 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 27.0 33.3 18.2 23.3 
POZORNOST 2.4 0.0 2.9 0.0 
-  NECESSARY 100.0 Na 100.0 Na 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 66.1 77.8 64.7 75.0 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 71.2 66.7 61.8 83.3 
 
 
Table 29. Passports at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 27.6 20.9 30.9 38.4 
NO. VISITS 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 20.6 8.3 20.6 21.7 
POZORNOST 4.2 0.0 7.4 4.7 
-  NECESSARY 44.4 Na 60.0 33.3 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 72.8 75.0 76.1 71.9 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 74.0 83.3 79.4 64.1 
 
 
                                                          
36 The percentages refer to all drivers who own cars.  Some of these respondents may have never been stopped by the 
traffic police. 
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Trends in Quality and Bribery 
 
Figure 17 shows the household perceptions of how quality has changed in the last three years and whether 
they think bribery has increased or decreased in the past three years.  For the traffic police, slightly more 
respondents believe that quality has increased than believe it has declined, the reverse being true for 
municipal and state police.37  In terms of bribery, the pattern is the opposite:  a large majority of 
respondents believe that corruption among the traffic police has increased, more so than for municipal or 
state police. 
 Figure 17.  Trends in Quality and Bribery in the Police 
(perceptions of households) 
Traffic Police Quality
worsened 
a lot worsened 
a bit
no change
improved 
a bit
improved 
a lot
Municipal Police Quality
worsened 
a lot
worsened 
a bit
no change
improved 
a bit
improved 
a lot
State Police Quality
worsened 
a lot
worsened 
a bit
no change
improved 
a bit
improved 
a lot
Traffic Police Bribery
increased 
a lot
increased 
a bit
no change
decreased 
a bit
decreased 
a lot
was and is 
no bribery
Municipal Police Bribery
increased 
a lot
increased 
a bit
no change
decreased 
a bit
decreased 
a lot
was and is 
no bribery
State Police Bribery
increased 
a lot
increased 
a bit
no change
decreased 
a bit
decreased 
a lot
was and is 
no bribery
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37 The question was phrased in a way to elicit opinions about municipal and state police excluding traffic police. 
Cadastre 
 
The Cadastre is responsible for maintaining 
records of, registering changes in, and providing 
verification of land ownership.  Most 
households that interacted with the cadastre 
reported being satisfied with their expience, 
although the fact that 40 percent were not 
satisfied suggests much room for improvement.  
Roughly one in seven households that had 
visited the Cadastre reported making an 
unofficial payment, the majority of those feeling 
that it was necessary to do so. 
 
 Table 30. Cadastre Registrations at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 21.2 16.8 24.8 26.4 
NO. VISITS 3.2 2.4 3.0 2.5 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 55.1 51.9 52.9 50.0 
POZORNOST 14.4 10.3 16.9 14.0 
-  NECESSARY 70.4 100.0 83.3 66.7 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 57.7 63.0 66.7 60.5 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 54.7 60.7 58.3 60.5 
 
 
Table 31. Cadastre Information Requests at a Glance 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 22.1 18.1 26.1 26.0 
NO. VISITS 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.5 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 52.1 41.7 47.5 54.5 
POZORNOST 13.3 0.0 14.5 17.8 
-  NECESSARY 79.2 Na 77.8 87.5 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 51.1 53.8 55.6 53.3 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 55.5 65.4 58.7 57.8 
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 Business Services  
 
Banking Services 
 
Although many banking services are provided by private banks, some banks are state owned and all banks, 
regardless of ownership, are heavily regulated.  The importance of the banking sector is evidenced by the 
fact than nearly three fourths of the enterprises surveyed reported interacting with banks in the previous 
twelve months.  Little more than half gave favorable quality ratings, and one in nine firms reported 
encountering bribery.   (See Table 32.)  Large firms were much more likely to encounter bribery than small 
or new firms.  Banking services stand out for the size of the bribes that are paid, averaging over 60,000 SK. 
The enterprise survey also included questions specifically about experiences in trying to get loans, and the 
responses make clear that bribes paid to private banks are as common, or more so, than bribes to state 
banks.  While only 6 percent of those who applied for loans from state banks reported making an unofficial 
payment, 13 percent of those who applied for a loan from private banks reported making unofficial 
payments.  Bribe sizes ranged from 2 to 30 
percent of the value of the loan, with the 
average for state and private banks being 
nearly the same. 
The responses to the enterprise survey make 
clear the link between transparency and 
bribery in loan processing.  (See Figure 18.)  
Firms that viewed the process as non-
transparent were nearly three times as likely to 
have bribed. 
Table 32. Banking Services at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 79.5 75.2 87.7 78.8 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 11.1 7.3 19.8 7.4 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 4.6 3.4 7.7 3.0 
BRIBE SIZE 63,155 36,900 80,658 10,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 53.8 57.0 45.0 50.6 
 
Firms that said Rules
ARE Transparent
paid 
bribe
Firms that said Rules
ARE NOT transparent
paid 
bribe
didn't 
pay 
bribe
Figure 18.  Transparency and Bribery in Banking 
didn't 
pay 
bribe
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Auditor Services  
 
Auditor services are provided by private 
companies, but their importance in 
documenting an enterprise’s books warrants 
their inclusion in this section.  Only a small 
percentage of enterprises reported paying 
bribes to auditors, although the sharp 
difference between the experiences of small 
and large companies suggests that small 
enterprise development may be relatively more 
hindered by corruption among auditors. (See 
Table 33.) 
Table 33. Auditors at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 31.2 17.3 63.3 25.3 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.3 6.8 1.4 4.8 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 2.4 4.3 1.4 2.4 
BRIBE SIZE 5,000b 5,000 Na Na 
RATING OF QUALITY 61.6 55.4 72.2 53.1 
 
Notaries 
 
Like auditors, notaries are licensed private 
people (firms) who provide indispensable 
business services.  Slightly more than one in 
twenty enterprises that visited notaries 
reported that an unofficial payment was made 
– small, new, enterprises were more likely to 
bribe notaries than large, old firms.38  (See 
Table 33.) 
Table 33. Notaries  at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New
CONTACT 52.1 41.3 77.1 48.8
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 5.5 7.5 3.5 11.9
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 2.3 4.0 0.5 5.3
BRIBE SIZE 4,429 2,800 8,500 1,333
RATING OF QUALITY 58.2 55.6 66.7 53.0
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38 “New” was defined to mean less than three years old. 
 Table 35.  Telecommunications: the Enterprise Perspective Utilities  
 
Telephone 
 
Enterprises and households alike 
must interact with the state-owned 
telephone company both to get lines 
installed and for repairs and 
maintenance.  Anecdotally, waiting 
times can be tremendous, making 
the alternative of paying a bribe 
palatable for those who have the 
money.   Of the enterprises that 
contacted the phone company, 18 
percent reported paying bribes – 
among households that contacted 
the telephone company for line 
installation of maintenance, 7 
percent said they paid bribes.  
Enterprises and households alike 
gave mediocre to poor ratings for 
quality. (See Tables 35 and 36.) 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 68.7 60.8 81.7 63.2 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 18.3 17.0 21.1 15.1 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 9.0 8.8 10.4 7.5 
BRIBE SIZE 7,539 3,247 12,077 4,333 
RATING OF QUALITY 44.9 47.5 37.5 41.1 
 
 
Table 36. Telephone Lines: the Household Perspective 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 25.4 22.7 28.5 27.3 
NO. VISITS 2.1 1.5 2.5 1.5 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 13.3 3.1 18.0 7.9 
POZORNOST 7.2 2.9 14.8 
-  NECESSARY 71.4 0.0 77.8 Na 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 59.4 74.2 55.7 60.0 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 60.3 69.7 59.0 65.0 
 
0.0 
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 Water, Gas, and Electricity 
 
One in ten enterprises that had contact 
with water, gas, or electricity 
companies reported paying a bribe, and 
quality ratings were mediocre.  Only 
half of enterprises gave a favorable 
rating.  (See Table 37.)  Households 
similarly reported having to make 
unofficial payments:  16 percent of 
those with contact paid unofficially for 
water connection or repair, 18 percent 
for gas, and 19 percent for electricity.  
(See Tables 38 through 40.) 
Table 37. Water, Gas and Electricity: the Enterprise 
Perspective 
 Overall Small Mediu
m and 
Large
New 
CONTACT 52.6 43.1 72.7 43.7 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 10.4 9.2 11.25 2.7 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.6 3.8 2.3 2.7 
BRIBE SIZEb 9,107 12,267 7,571 50,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 51.0 54.2 45.0 47.0 
bOnly a single enterprise in the “new” category reported the bribe size. 
 
Table 38. Water: the Household Perspective 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 11.0 10.7 10.3 12.4 
NO. VISITS 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.1 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 27.4 16.7 35.3 9.1 
POZORNOST 16.2 15.8 16.7 16.7 
-  NECESSARY 70.0 66.7 100.0 50.0 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 52.9 52.6 61.1 58.3 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 52.9 52.6 61.1 58.3 
 
 
Table 39. Gas: the Household Perspective 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 13.6 12.3 15.5 14.0 
NO. VISITS 2.2 2.3 2.6 1.8 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 39.8 19.0 40.0 61.1 
POZORNOST 17.5 9.5 15.6 15.8 
-  NECESSARY 64.7 50.0 80.0 66.7 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 69.4 57.1 65.6 89.5 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 75.5 71.4 68.8 89.5 
 
 
Table 50. Electricity: the Household Perspective 
 Overall Poorest 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Richest 
30% 
CONTACT 11.3 9.5 12.4 14.0 
NO. VISITS 2.18 2.4 2.3 2.1 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 33.9 22.2 36.8 45.5 
POZORNOST 19.0 11.1 15.0 18.2 
-  NECESSARY 72.7 100.0 66.7 100.0 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR 65.6 77.8 60.0 75.0 
OVERALL SATISFACTION 62.5 77.8 65.0 66.7 
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 Regulations, Inspections, and Licensing 
 
Business Registration 
 
The first step in establishing a business concern in Slovakia is to officially register as an economic entity 
with the Business Registry, which is handled by the courts.  Existing companies must also deal with the 
registry whenever changing the form of organization of the company, revising the charter, etc.  Among the 
firms that interacted with the 
business registry in Slovakia, 15 
percent reported that they had 
paid some bribe, and less than 
40 percent gave a favorable 
quality assessment.  Moreover, 
the business registry is among 
the organizations with the most 
expensive bribes, averaging 
over 6,000 SK.  (See Table 51.) 
Table 51. Business Registry at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
New 
CONTACT 51.8 40.8 77.3 46.0 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 15.2 11.7 18.8 15.4 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 9.5 6.1 12.4 11.5 
BRIBE SIZE 6,628 6,577 5,831 10,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 37.2 40.8 32.5 36.6 
 
 
Enterprises were also asked to describe their experiences when they registered.  Most (57 percent) said the 
experience was uncomplicated and they did not pay a bribe.  Twenty-nine percent said it was complicated 
and 12 percent said they paid a bribe.  The year when registering companies were most likely to pay bribes 
was 1994.  (See Figure 19.)  
Figure 19. Business Registry 
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 Import, Export and Other Licenses  
 
Nearly 15 percent of enterprises in the 
sample had obtained an export license in 
the two years before the survey, and 21 
percent had received an import license.  Of 
those who had tried to get an import or 
export license in the previous twelve 
months, one in three encountered bribery.  
Moreover, while small enterprises were 
less likely to seek an import or export 
license, those that did were more likely to 
encounter bribery.  Most  enterprises – 74 
percent for export licenses and 63 percent 
for import licenses – reported the process 
of assigning licenses to be transparent.  
The data suggest, however, that while 
transparency helps to limit the practice – 
enterprises who found the process of 
assigning import licenses to be non-
transparent were more than twice as likely 
to report paying a bribe – it is not sufficient 
to ensure non-corrupt allocation of 
licenses: more than one in five enterprises 
that reported the process to be transparent 
also said they had paid a bribe in order to 
get the import or export license.39 
Table 52. Import/Export Licenses at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New
CONTACT 26.2 19.8 40.0 25.3
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 33.7 38.0 26.7 28.6
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 22.0 24.5 18.7 23.8
BRIBE SIZE 14,184 5,421 25,411 5,083
RATING OF QUALITY 16.9 16.8 19.1 22.5
 
 
Table 53. Other Licenses at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 14.9 9.1 26.4 11.5 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 23.3 20.8 22.6 10.0 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 19.1 18.8 17.4 10.0 
BRIBE SIZEa 7,875 3,900 10,833 3,000b 
RATING OF QUALITY 23.1 20.0 28.8 32.1 
aOnly one respondent in the “new” category supplied the size of the bribe. 
Overt bribery is but one way that the process of assigning a license can be subverted.  Political pressure and 
the use of connections also generates favoritism that is in itself a form of corruption.  Enterprises that had 
received import and export licenses were asked about the methods that they used to obtain the licenses.  
Over half used connections, political influence, or outright bribes in order to win the licenses. 
The other types of licenses that 
enterprises must get (e.g., retail trade 
licenses) were also reported to be 
frequent causes for bribery.  Twenty-
three percent of the enterprises that 
received licenses reported paying a 
bribe, and the assessment of quality 
was dismal with less than one if four 
enterprises reporting favorably.  (See 
Table 53.) 
Figure 20.  Methods of Getting …
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39 For export and import licenses respectively,  20.5 and 21.6 percent of those who found the process transparent 
reported paying a bribe, and 23.1 and 46.7 percent of those who found the process to be non-transparent reported 
paying bribes. 
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Construction Permits  
 
Construction permits, issued by regional and 
district bodies of state administration, were 
among the worst of the 21 bodies and 
services evaluated in the enterprise survey in 
terms of bribery.  Over 30 percent of the 
enterprises that had been in contact in the 
previous twelve months reported paying a 
bribe, and only 28 percent gave a favorable 
quality rating.  (See Table 54.) 
Table 54. Construction Permits at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 21.6 15.7 34.8 12.6 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 30.2 29.3 31.7 18.2 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 23.6 24.6 22.5 18.2 
BRIBE SIZE 7,533 3,400 9,556 6,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 28.0 25.8 32.9 20.0  
Fire Supervision 
 
Fire inspectors, with the authority to shut 
down an enterprise’s operations40, are able to 
exert tremendous power over enterprises that 
find themselves in violation of fire codes.  
Roughly 14 percent of the enterprises that 
came into contact with the fire supervision 
reported that they had paid a bribe, with 
small firms paying the most frequently.  
Quality ratings, however, were better than 
most, with over 60 percent of enterprises 
reporting favorably.  (See Table 55.) 
Table 55. Fire Supervision at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 31.8 18.8 62.7 31.0 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 13.9 18.8 10.1 14.8 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 12.6 18.1 8.1 14.8 
BRIBE SIZE 2,331 2,375 2,296 2,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 61.6 63.7 59.6 66.0 
 
Hygiene Supervision 
 
Like the fire supervision, hygiene inspectors 
have great power over the enterprises they 
supervise, and like fire inspections, hygiene 
supervision is more likely to be associated 
with bribery by small firms.  The level of 
bribery overall, however, is somewhat lower 
– “only” 7 percent of firms that came into 
contact with hygiene supervision reported 
paying a bribe.  (See Table 56.) 
Table 56. Hygiene Supervision at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 33.8 26.3 54.1 31.0 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 6.9 10.4 3.3 11.1 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.9 5.8 1.8 6.8 
BRIBE SIZE 1,480 467 3,000 100 
RATING OF QUALITY 57.5 57.7 57.0 53.8  
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40 It is indisputable that providing inspectors such power is important, since unsafe conditions can provide an imminent 
threat to human life. 
Office of Environmental Protection  
 
Environmental protection supervises 
adherence with environmental laws, and 
signs off on new projects for compliance 
with the law.  One in eight enterprises that 
interacted with the environmental protection 
reported paying bribes, and the quality rating 
was fairly poor, with less than 40 percent 
reporting satisfactory treatment.  (See Table 
57.) 
Table 57. Office of Environmental Protection at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 28.6 18.9 52.7 24.1 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 12.7 12.5 13.6 5.0 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 9.6 9.0 10.7 5.0 
BRIBE SIZEa 3,213 4,520 2,000b 
RATING OF QUALITY 38.1 35.2 40.0 34.0 
aOnly a single enterprise in the “new” category reported the size of the bribe.
600 
 
Certification Authority  
 
Table 58. Certification Authority at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 23.3 19.0 37.3 23.3 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 31.3 38.8 20.9 15.0 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 18.7 23.5 12.8 9.2 
BRIBE SIZE 5,965 7,878 2,929 Na 
RATING OF QUALITY 25.4 19.8 34.3 25.0 
 
The Certification Authority, responsible for 
supervising the testing and certification of 
goods, is among the organizations with the 
worst report card from enterprises.  More 
than 30 percent (38 percent for small firms) 
of the firms that contacted the Certification 
Authority reported paying bribes, and only 
one firm in four gave a favorable quality 
rating to the organization.  (See Table 58.) 
 
 
 
Business Authority  
 
The Business Authority, within the 
competence of regional and district state 
administration, receives mediocre ratings from 
the enterprises governed by it.  Seven percent 
reported paying bribes, less than many other 
enterprise regulators, and less than half gave a 
favorable rating for quality. 
Table 59. Business Authority at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 52.6 47.2 61.5 49.4 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 7.4 6.7 8.7 11.9 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 4.8 4.8 4.5 10.7 
BRIBE SIZE 3,412 3,625 2,924 5,667 
RATING OF QUALITY 48.8 48.6 53.7 54.2  
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State Business Supervision  
 
State Business Supervision, which 
monitors consumer protection (e.g., 
checking goods in retail shops), was 
identified by enterprises as a key problem 
area for corruption.  Over 27 percent of the 
firms with contact reported paying bribes 
(30 percent for small firms), and less than a 
third gave a favorable quality rating.  (See 
Table 60.) 
Table 60. State Business Supervision at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 23.6 19.2 32.4 20.7 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 27.5 30.6 22.2 27.8 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 20.3 23.6 16.6 20.6 
BRIBE SIZE 3,513 1,338 4,400 1,067 
RATING OF QUALITY 32.1 31.8 35.0 27.5 
 
 
 
Health and Social Insurance, Labor Office, and Labor Security Authority 
 
The Health and Social Insurance Offices 
receive poor ratings for quality – less than 30 
percent reported favorably – but relatively 
few firms (3 percent) reported paying bribes.  
(See Table 61.)  Similarly, four percent of 
enterprises contacting the Labor Office 
reported paying a bribe, and 37 percent gave 
a favorable quality rating.  (See Table 62.) 
The Labor Security Authority, which 
monitors workplace safety and health issues, 
received poorer marks for bribery from the 
enterprises that contacted it – thirteen 
percent reported paying a bribe.  Half the 
enterprises gave a favorable quality rating. 
(See Table 63.) 
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Table 61. Health and Social Insurance Companies at a 
Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 70.5 67.1 75.2 68.6 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.0 2.4 4.8 1.7 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 1.3 0.6 3.1 0.3 
BRIBE SIZE 1,430 500 2,050 Na 
RATING OF QUALITY 29.1 30.3 27.4 26.3 
 
 
Table 62. Labor Office at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 50.9 42.7 67.9 51.7 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.6 4.6 2.7 2.3 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 2.0 1.8 2.5 1.1 
BRIBE SIZE 1,304 1,600 120 5,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 37.4 39.3 37.5 44.2 
 
 
Table 63. Labor Security Authority  at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 25.6 12.5 56.9 23.0 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 13.1 12.5 14.3 10.0 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 9.4 8.7 10.5 8.3 
BRIBE SIZE 2,965 833 3,765 2,500 
RATING OF QUALITY 49.0 49.5 50.0 42.9 
 
 
Tax and Customs 
 
Tax  
 
Tax officials, with the power to cost or 
save an enterprise huge sums of money, are 
cited in many countries as centers of 
corruption.  In Slovakia, however, the Tax 
Office does not stand out as one of the 
worst offenders.  Nevertheless, nine 
percent of the enterprises that contacted the 
tax authority reported paying a bribe, and 
less than 40 percent gave a favorable 
quality rating, so there is clearly much 
room for improvement. (See Table 64.) 
Customs  
 
Customs offices the world over are 
renowned as centers of corruption.  In 
Slovakia, one in three enterprises that 
interacted with customs reported paying 
a bribe, and only 17 percent gave a 
favorable quality rating, among the worst 
in the sample.  While some bribes are 
very high – one was reported to be 
100,000 SK – the median bribe size is 
relative low.  (See Table 65.) 
 
  
 Table 64. Tax at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 85.6 83.0 89.9 83.9 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 8.9 5.2 15.3 1.4 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 3.7 3.2 4.8 0.5 
BRIBE SIZE 5,683 2,725 8,205 1,000 
RATING OF QUALITY 38.2 39.1 37.4 34.9 Table 65. Customs at a Glance 
 Overall Small Medium 
and 
Large 
New 
CONTACT 40.5 32.5 59.6 34.9 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 34.0 33.7 31.8 23.3 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING BRIBERY 15.8 17.1 13.8 9.6 
BRIBE SIZE 5,795 2,009 3,967 1,813 
RATING OF QUALITY 17.2 15.8 21.8 15.4 49
 4. Cross-Sectoral Issues 
Unofficial Financing of Political Parties 
 
While all forms of corruption damage society, none causes a greater diminution of faith in the institutions 
of state than when the lawmakers themselves are perceived to be corrupt.  When the very framework of law 
becomes suspect, not only does state policy become oriented for the benefit of the few rather than the 
whole of society, but the prospects for fighting corruption dwindle.  In all societies, firms (and citizens) try 
to influence lawmakers to see their points of view.  But the modes of interaction between the private sector 
and lawmakers can take many forms.  On one extreme, lobbying takes place transparently, with clear 
identification of financial linkages between firms and politicians and political parties.  On the other 
extreme, bribes can be paid to politicians, or non-transparent financing of political parties can act as a 
surrogate bribe. 
In Slovakia, 11 percent of enterprises reported that firms like theirs “sponsor political parties”, and 8 
percent admitted that firms like theirs provide unofficial payments to sponsor political parties.  While firms 
of all sizes admitted this practice, larger firms reported unofficial sponsoring at a higher rate:  one of eight 
firms with more than 15 employees said they provided unofficial payments to political parties. 
Figure 21. Sponsoring of Political Parties … 
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Sixty-three percent of firms that admitted to unofficially sponsoring political parties reported paying a bribe 
in the 3 years before the survey, while only 40 percent of those who do not sponsor political parties 
reported paying bribes.41 Moreover, a glance at the relationship between unofficial sponsoring of political 
parties and various other forms of corruption illuminates how the practice twists public policy toward 
corruption – unofficial sponsoring of political parties is highly correlated with the use of political pressure 
to obtain state subsidies.42  (See below for more on state subsidies.) 
The public officials themselves expressed much concern over corruption in the lawmaking apparatus.  
More than one in three public officials reported that in parliament, “political payoffs to benefit political 
parties or a political campaign” appears often in Slovakia.  Nearly as many feel that the central government 
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41 This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. 
42 The relationship is significant at the 1 percent level. 
likewise accepts payoffs for the benefit of parties and campaigns.  A third of public officials also believe 
that parliament “accepts bribes in return for influencing decisions”, and a fourth believe that parliament 
“accepts bribes in return for influencing the content of laws.” 
While the degree of unofficial sponsoring of political parties may be a cause for concern, there is also some 
indication that the situation has improved slightly in recent years.  Fewer firms believe that sponsoring of 
political parties is common now than believed so prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections.  (See Figure 
21.) 
National Property Fund 
 
A hallmark of the transition from communism to freedom is the massive transfer of property from state to 
private ownership.  Because the value of property being transferred can be enormous, the profits that can be 
gained through corruption in the privatization process can be enormous, as well.  At its worst, state insiders 
can manipulate the privatization process to their advantage, institutionalizing corruption by privatizating to 
reward cronies and political supporters.  (See the previous section for an indication of the levels and trends 
of unofficial sponsoring of political parties.) 
Forty-four percent of enterprises identified the National Property Fund as an organization in which 
corruption is “very widespread”, and a further 29 percent said that corruption exists but they could not 
assess the extent.  These numbers are based on the perceptions of the surveyed enterprises, rather than their 
actual experiences in dealing with the organization.  To get a more precise idea of how widespread 
corruption is in the National Property Fund, we restricted the sample to the subset of privatized enterprises.  
The responses for this subset were not that different from the rest of the population:  41 percent of 
privatized enterprises said corruption in the national Property Fund was very widespread, and a further 33 
percent said it does exist but they can not judge the extent.  Less than 2 percent of privatized enterprises 
said that corruption does not exist at the National Property Fund. 
Subsidies 
 
One out of five enterprises reported receiving some form of subsidies from the state.  Of those, 12 percent 
reported paying a bribes to get the subsidy, always in combination with either political influence or 
connections with friends or relatives.  (Nearly as many refused to answer the question about the bribe.)  
Figure 22. Size of Bribes for Subsidies 
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subsidy, how much of the subsidy amount has to be given as a bribe?"
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Sixty-one percent reported that the process was transparent, meaning that nearly 2 in 5 reported otherwise.  
When asked how much must be paid as a bribe in order to get the subsidy, the majority reported that 10 
percent of the subsidy amount must be given in bribes.  (See Figure 22.) 
 
Although “only” 10-12 percent43 admitted paying 
bribes to get the subsidies, the process was 
subverted in other ways, as well.  Nearly 40 percent 
admitted to using friends or relatives to get the 
subsidies, and 7 percent admitted to using political 
influence.  (Since an enterprise can use a 
combination of these means, the numbers do not 
correspond to those in Figure 23, which refers to, 
e.g.,  use of friends and relatives alone.) 
  
Selling to the State 
 
One in three enterprises reported that they sell some 
of their products or services to the state, and of 
those, 28 percent receive at least a quarter of their 
revenues from state sales.  Of the firms with sales to 
the state, one in four reported that firms like theirs 
pay bribes to win state contracts.44  Those that are 
more dependent on state sales report even high bribe frequencies.  Of the firms in the sample that derive 
more than a quarter of their revenues from state sales45, 42 percent reported that firms like theirs pay bribes 
in order to win 
contracts with 
the state.  (See 
Figure 24.) 
Figure 24. Size of Bribes for State Orders 
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43 Overall, 12 percent of enterprises that received subsidies said they paid a bribe after deleting refusals.  To calculate 
the values in Figure 23 required also dropping refusals to two other questions, resulting in a slightly different sample – 
in the second sample, 10.4 percent of enterprises admitted paying bribes. 
44 Based on a question about the size of bribes required.  Responses of “I don’t know” were presumed to mean that the 
enterprise does not pay bribes for state contracts. 
45 There were 31 such firms in the sample. 
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Public Sector Tenders 
 
Thirty percent of enterprises reported that they had participated in at least one tender in the two years 
before the survey, and nearly all of those firms participated in multiple tenders.  These tenders were 
organized by ministries, local state administration, local self-government, state and private companies, 
banks, and other institutions.  These same enterprises were asked to asses how frequently one must pay 
bribes to win public sector tenders.  The responses, presented in Figure 25, demonstrate that very few 
believe that public sector tenders can be won entirely without bribes, and many believe that bribery for 
public sector tenders occurs frequently. 
Figure 25. “How Frequently do Enterprises have to Pay 
Bribes to Win Public Sector Tenders?” 
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Corruption in public sector tenders does not just cause a misallocation of the state’s resources, it also may 
dissuade honest companies from participating.  The survey of enterprises asked whether the enterprise had 
declined to participate in a tender that it had previously considered, and if so, what was the reason.  
Although the most cited reasons were unfair competition and complexity of the process, perceived 
corruption was also important – one third of enterprises that declined to participate in a tender cited the 
need for unofficial payments as an important reason.  (See Table 66.)  Not surprisingly, perceptions of 
corruption in the tender process are closely linked with perception that competition is unfair.  Among those 
enterprises that did not cite unfair competition, only 20 percent said corruption was the reason for not 
participating, while among enterprises that did believe competition was unfair, 48 percent also cited 
corruption. 
Table 66.  Reasons for Not Participating in Public Sector Tenders 
Percent of respondents saying it was an important reason 
The process was too complex; there were too many documents to submit 46.2% 
The process was too expensive, or participants were required to make a 
prepayment to demonstrate earnestness 
26.9% 
Participants must make too many unofficial payments (bribes) 34.6% 
Competition was unfair 51.9% 
No personal connections with organizers 36.5% 
The conditions of the tender were not transparent 44.2% 
Includes only the experiences of enterprises that said public sector procurement was relevant to the 
enterprise’s business. 
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5. Corruption and the Public Sector 
 
The problem of corruption is far easier to observe and identify than it is to solve.  Most anticorruption 
interventions come in three categories: those that focus on the criminality of corruption, those that focus on 
the public sector institutions that exacerbate the problem, and those that focus on changing the informal 
codes of conduct that makes corruption acceptable.46  If effective, focusing on the criminality of corruption 
– ensuring adequate legal framework for prosecuting cases, training of investigators, etc. – may help to 
increase the cost of corrupt activity and thereby reduce it.  Similarly, focus on public sector institutions may 
reduce the opportunities for corruption, and campaigns to help people understand the costs of corruption 
can help reduce the public’s tolerance for corrupt behavior and inefficient government.  These three 
approaches are crucially dependent on each other –  each needs the other in order to be effective.  
The 352 public officials that participated in the survey provided a wealth of information on the internal 
incentives they face, the existence and implementation of formal rules, the manner in which they interact 
with the public and with the private sector.  While most public officials reported  that rules were sound and 
well implemented, there is sufficient variation in responses to identify characteristics of public 
administration that weaken the ability of the public sector to deliver quality services, and create 
opportunities for corrupt behavior.  Understanding these weaknesses helps to give direction to the 
prevention aspect of anticorruption.   
Responses to the public official survey confirm the findings from the household and enterprise surveys that 
the use of gifts and bribes is common.  More than two out of five officials said they had been offered a gift, 
and one in ten had been offered money or an expensive present, in the two years before the survey.  (See 
Table 67.)  Of those who frequently interact with the public, roughly half had been offered small gifts, and 
10-15 percent had been offered money or expensive presents. 
Table 67.  Offers of Gifts and Money for Officials Dealing with the Public 
 Entire 
Sampl
e 
Officials that often 
interact with 
Enterprises 
Officials that often 
interact with Private 
People 
Number of Observations 346 244 276 
Percent indicating they had been offered a 
small Gift in the previous two years. 
42.3 53.9 45.5 
Percent indicating they had been offered 
Money or an Expensive present in the 
previous two years. 
9.7 15.4 10.3 
Less than two percent of respondents refused to answer the question.  These responses omitted from the 
above calculations.  This table refers to offers of gifts and money, but does not indicate whether the gifts 
or money were accepted. 
 
Public officials also clearly indicated that the offers of bribes by clients were sometimes accepted at their 
institutions.  Nearly a quarter of the central government officials reported that corruption was widespread at 
their institution, and nearly half of the officials at the regional and district bodies of state administration 
report the same.  (See Figure 26.)  A smaller percentage of officials from local self-governments reported 
corruption to be widespread. 
                                                          
46 These correspond with the three pillars of the National Program for the Fight Against Corruption: enforcement, 
prevention, and education. 
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Figure 26. Public Official’s Assessments of the Levels of 
Corruption in their Institutions
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Corruption: Poor Quality, Slow Service Delivery, and Excessive Bureaucracy 
 
While most public officials feel that their institutions offer quality services, it is also true that most believe 
that incentives to generate quality service delivery do not exist in their institutions.  Examining the levels of 
quality and the incentives to produce quality together demonstrates the link between incentives and 
outcomes.  Figure 27 demonstrates quite clearly that from the perspective of the public official, high quality 
service in associated with low levels of corruption. 
Figure 27.  Corruption and Quality of Service Delivery 
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Slowness of service delivery fosters corruption – from the perspective of an enterprise waiting for a permit, 
or a household waiting for their day in court, a bribe may be a small price to pay speed things along.  
Responses to the public official’s survey suggests that corruption is greatly facilitated by slow service 
delivery, which in turn is frequently generated by bureaucratic rules that hinder an institution’s ability to 
deliver services quickly.  (See Figure 28.) 
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 Figure 28.  Rules that Slow Service Delivery Contribute to Corruption 
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Beyond being a source of corruption, slow service delivery and bureaucracy are problems in themselves.  
Enterprises cited bureaucracy as one of the most important problems they face in doing business.  (See 
Figure 9.)  The household survey also demonstrates that satisfaction with public agencies is closely linked 
with the bureaucratic hurdles that were faced – agencies that force clients to make multiple visits are the 
same ones that leave feelings of dissatisfaction.  (See Figure 29.) 
 
 
Figure 29. Bureaucracy and Dissatisfaction 
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Public Sector Values, Structures, and Administrative Institutions 
 
How Does Corruption Work and How is it Dealt With? 
 
An understanding of the mechanics of bribery provides insight into possible means of reducing the practice.  
Respondents to the public officials survey were asked a series of question on the mechanics of bribery.  
Interestingly, the surveyed public officials reported that bribery would be more likely to involve local 
entrepreneurs than foreign entrepreneurs.  Moreover, local entrepreneurs would be more likely to initiate 
the bribe.  (See Table 68.) 
Table 68.  How Does Corruption Work? 
 
“Imagine that someone comes to an institution like yours and asks for something.  What 
would happen if the person is a …” 
 Citizena Local 
Entrepreneurb 
Foreign 
Entrepreneurb 
The worker of the institution 
would indicate that a bribe 
would be very suitable. 
3.0 4.4 6.8 
The person would unilaterally 
offer a bribe 
6.0 20.2 9.1 
The application would be 
processed in accordance with 
the law. 
91.0 75.5 84.2 
aIncludes only the responses of officials that frequently interact with private people; bIncludes only 
the responses of officials that frequently interact with enterprises. 
 
The public officials survey also posed the following hypothetical question: “when a mid-level clerk at your 
institution extracts a bribe, he/she usually shares with superiors, shares with colleagues or keeps all for 
himself or herself”.  An option was also presented for “bribes are not accepted here at all.”  Among 
institutions where respondents provided answers, over three fourths said the official would keep the entire 
bribe to himself, 18 percent said the bribe would be shared with colleagues and 5 percent said it would be 
shared with superiors.  These numbers are not as bad as in other transition countries in which similar 
questions have been asked.47 
The public officials survey also demonstrates the role that enforcement of anticorruption rules can play in 
reducing corruption.  When asked how a confirmed case of bribery would be dealt with in their institution, 
22 percent of officials responded that they did not know how bribery is punished within their institution, 
roughly the same for all three levels of government.  (See Table 69.)  Only about half the respondents 
believe the person would be dismissed or accused of a crime.  Among institutions, the respondents working 
for the police reported the toughest punishment regime: 53 percent said a bribe taker would be accused of a 
crime, and another 35 percent said the person would be dismissed.  Since households reported low levels of 
bribery among interactions with the police (with the exception of the traffic police), it would appear that a 
sound understanding of the punishment for taking bribes might limit the scope of corruption.  On the other 
hand, local self-governments, generally viewed as less corrupt than counterparts in the state administration, 
appear to be the softest on bribe-takers. 
                                                          
47 In a 1998 World Bank survey of public officials in Latvia, over 50 percent reported that bribes are shared.  A similar  
question was asked in four countries in 1999 and reported in William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. 
Koshechkina, “Confessions of Justified Sinners: Why Postcommunist Officials Accept Presents and Bribes”, paper 
prepared for BASEES Annual Conference, March 1999.  The percentage reporting that bribes are shared with 
colleagues and superiors was 37 percent in both Czech and Slovakia, more than 60 percent in the Ukraine, and more 
than 70 percent in Bulgaria and Georgia. It should be noted that there were minor variations in the wording and the 
approach to sampling was different as well, so these numbers are merely illustrative.  
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Table 69.  Perceived Punishment for Accepting Bribes 
 Percentage responding: 
“What would be the most probable 
punishment for a worker in your position, if 
he/she accepted a bribe?” 
Overall Central Regional Local 
Probably wouldn’t be punished at all 5.7 9.3 3.3 4.4 
Punished just modestly within the institution 
(admonition, fine) 
12.5 10.2 5.8 21.9 
Punished more severely within the institution 
(transfer, not allowed to be promoted) 
9.9 9.3 10.0 10.5 
The person would be dismissed 37.8 39.8 41.7 31.6 
A crime would be reported to the police 
(awaiting translation) 
11.9 10.2 15.8 9.7 
I don’t know 22.2 21.2 23.3 21.9 
 
Despite the fact that half of the officials understand the penalty for corruption to be dismissal or worse, 
there seems to be among many respondents a tolerance for accepting bribes.  Less than 12 percent of the 
surveyed officials indicated that they would certainly report a peer who accepted a bribe, while 15 percent 
indicated they definitely would not report such a case; more respondents said they would probably not 
report such a case than said they probably would.  Of those who said they probably would not report, many 
cited the fear of harming themselves (e.g., “I am afraid for my job”), and a distaste for hurting colleagues 
(e.g., “I don’t want to cause problems for them”). 
 
Organizational Mission and Objectives 
 
Slovak officials generally reported that the people within their institutions understand their institution’s 
objectives and strategies, identify with those objectives, and view citizens and users as their clients – at 
every level of government, two out of three officials reported as much.  (See Table 70.)  There is variation, 
however, in responses across levels of government.  Those in local self-government felt the most closely 
identified with an organizational mission, and were much more likely to view the citizen as client.  
Table 70.  Identification with Mission, Citizen as Client 
  Overall Central Regional Local 
Definitely Yes 35.1 33.9 26.9 45.1 
Rather Yes 38.3 33.1 42.0 39.8 
Rather No 23.1 28.0 28.6 12.4 
“Everyone has a clear idea 
of objectives and stategy” 
Definitely No 3.4 5.1 2.5 2.7 
Definitely Yes 36.0 25.0 26.3 57.5 
Rather Yes 42.1 49.1 44.9 31.9 
Rather No 18.4 20.7 24.6 9.7 
“Everyone views the
citizen/user as the client” 
Definitely No 3.5 5.2 4.2 0.9 
Definitely Yes 26.4 20.3 23.5 35.7 
Rather Yes 44.4 44.9 40.3 48.2 
Rather No 26.4 29.7 34.5 14.3 
“Everyone identifies with
and is involved with the
objectives and strategies” 
Definitely No 2.9 5.1 1.7 1.8 
 
On an individual basis, officials who believe that staff in their institutions have a clear idea of the mission 
and objectives are much less likely to have been offered a small present, although there is little difference 
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for whether they’ve been offered money.48  Interestingly, the relationship between having been offered 
small gifts and knowledge of the organizational mission holds whether or not controlling for organizational 
effects (although the effect is statistically stronger when organizational effects are not included).  This 
means that organizations which are offered gifts more frequently are those that understand their mission the 
worst, but it also means that within a given organization, those who understand the mission best are less 
likely to have been offered a small gift. 
The degree of identification with the organization’s mission is also extremely highly correlated with the 
perceived level of corruption within that organization.  (See Figure 30.)  Institutions with staff that more 
fully identify with the institution’s objectives are also the institutions which are perceived by the officials 
who work there to have lower levels of corruption.  This effect is extremely strong and does not seem to be 
caused by general pessimism on the respondent’s part.49 
Figure 30.  Organizational Mission and Corruption 
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48 Probit regressions were run using as dependent variables whether or not the official had been offered a gift, and 
whether or not the official had been offered money in the past two years.  An index of identification with the 
organization’s objectives and a series of broad organizational dummies served as independent variables.  For the 
regressions related to gifts, the coefficient on the index was significant at the 1% level, and for the regressions related 
to money, the coefficient on the index was significant at the 30% level.  When a system of detailed organizational 
dummies was used to replace the broader dummies in the gifts regression, the coefficient on the index of identification 
with the organization’s objectives remained significant at the 5% level. 
49 When the level of corruption within the organization is regressed on the degree of identification with the mission 
state and an assessment of the overall level of corruption in society, the coefficient on identification with the mission 
remains significant at the 0.01% level. 
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Internal Administration 
 
Respondents overwhelmingly reported that the procedures, guidelines, and regulations of internal 
management existed in a formal, written form with 97 percent of respondents replying as much.  (See Table 
71.)  Most also reported that the rules and procedures were relevant to the institution’s objectives (82 
percent), and are simple, clear and easy to understand (83 percent). 
Despite their formal existence, however, only 57 percent of respondents said that the rules of internal 
administration are implemented, and only 58 percent said the rules are monitored.  Only half the 
respondents said the rules of internal administration are enforced. 
All of the indicators of the quality of internal management are highly correlated with the level of corruption 
within the institution.50  Three indicators are particularly strong for explaining the level of corruption.  As 
described earlier, the institutions in which the procedures and rules “add too much time to the process of 
decision making and service delivery” were those self-assessed to be the most corrupt.  Clarity and 
simplicity of the procedures were highly associated with low corruption, and institutions where the number 
of agencies and departments involved in decision making were appropriate also had lower levels of 
corruption.  All of these factors are highly consistent with the argument made elsewhere in this report that 
many bribes are motivated by the desire to speed through bureaucracy. 
Table 71.  Rules of Internal Administration  
Percent agreeing that … Overa
ll 
Centr
al 
Regiona
l 
Local Bosse
s 
Staff 
Formal (officially approved and written) 96.7 96.6 95.8 100 98.7 96.5 
Simple, clear, and easy to understand 82.9 88.1 74.2 96.8 90.7 81.4 
Do not impose excess administrative 
steps 
56.1 70.3 45.0 45.2 62.8 54.9 
Well specified, leaving no room for 
discretion 
68.8 73.7 64.2 67.7 69.8 68.6 
Stable (not changing or being re-written 
all the time) 
69.1 71.2 64.2 80.6 47.4 68.1 
Well monitored 57.6 55.9 56.7 67.7 58.1 57.5 
Strictly enforced 50.6 46.6 55.0 48.4 55.8 49.6 
Strictly implemented 56.9 57.6 55.0 61.3 60.5 56.2 
71.0 72.0 66.7 83.9 79.1 69.5 
Meet the objectives of the institution 82.2 83.1 77.5 97.8 83.7 81.9 
Does not include opinions of elected officials (mayors, deputies, etc.) 
Do not slow down the process of 
decision making and service delivery 
                                                          
50 Regressing an index of corruption on each indicator of the quality of internal administration outlined in Table 78 
always yields a coefficient significant at the 5% level, at least. 
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 Figure 31.  Quality of Internal Administration and Corruption 
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Research suggests that excessive administrative discretion is an importance factor contributing to 
corruption51.  Unambiguous and clear procedures leave less room for discretion and limit the ability to 
collect bribes.  In Slovakia, many officials reported that their supervisors, peers, and they themselves 
“sometimes act on their own accounts” – less than half say they follow one predefined official procedure.  
(See Table 72.)  The link between administrative discretion and corruption levels that has been found in 
cross-country studies hold true in Slovakia, as well.  Where discretion is highest, so is corruption, as is 
clear from the Figure 32, below.52 
Table 72.  Consistent Unambiguous Procedures  
 Overa
ll 
Centr
al 
Regiona
l 
Local Bosse
s 
Staff 
Your supervisors follow exclusively one 
unambiguous predefined official 
procedure 
35.7 37.9 36.3 24.1 34.1 35.9 
Your peers follow exclusively one 
unambiguous predefined official 
procedure 
42.7 38.5 50.4 26.1 36.6 43.9 
You (personally) follow exclusively one 
unambiguous predefined official 
procedure 
47.7 46.6 47.9 51.6 47.6 47.8 
                                                          
51 E.g., Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón “Corruption, Public Finances, and the Unofficial 
Economy” 1998: “… the problem lies with the discretionary application of tax and regulatory regimes in many 
countries.” (p. 1) 
52 When regressing corruption on an index of “predefined unambiguous procedures”  (based on the variables in Table 
72), the coefficient on unambiguous procedures is significant at the 0.1% level.  This result hold when organizational 
dummy variables are included; adjusted R-squared rises from 0.04 to 0.25 when organizational dummies are included, 
suggesting that there is both an effect between governmental bodies, and an effect within governmental bodies.  Probits 
were also run with whether or not the respondent had been offered a bribe in the previous two years as the dependent 
variable.  For offers of gifts, the coefficient on information openness was significant at the 10% level (also at the 10% 
level when organizational dummies were included); for offers of money, the coefficient was not significant. 
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 Figure 32.  The Importance of Unambiguous Procedures 
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Personnel Policy 
 
When discussing the divisive issue of corruption, it is far too easy to stereotype public sector employees as 
the enemy, agents that must be closely monitored to ensure that they work hard and follow the rules.  It is 
easy to forget that the public sector’s employees are also its greatest assets, and that positive inducements 
can be just as effective for stimulating hard and honest work.  When we asked public officials why they 
remained working at their institutions, the important reasons were the “certainty of a stable job” (66 
percent), immediately followed by “self-satisfaction in doing the job” (56 percent), and “the chance to work 
in one’s field of expertise” (56 percent).  Only 5 percent of respondents cited the salary as a reason for 
working at their institution. 
Eight out of ten officials reported that personnel decisions (recruitment, appointments, promotions, salary 
increases) are based on formal, written, rules, and the majority believe that personnel decisions are based 
on merit and qualifications.  While these responses are encouraging, it is clear that personnel decisions are 
also based on other factors.  More than one out of three respondents said that political affiliation affects 
personnel decisions, and 40 percent said that changes in political administration affected personnel policies; 
19 percent said family connections were important, and 26 percent said that regional connections were 
important.  One out of sixteen officials said that unofficial payments played a role in personnel decisions.53 
                                                          
53 Among regional offices, 18 percent of respondents in district offices, 12 percent from the labor office, 9 percent from 
social insurance, and 7 percent from the polices said unofficial payments played a role.  It should be noted that the 
number of observations for each of these organizations ranges from 11 to 22, so conclusions about which organization 
is the worst can not be made.  
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Table 73.  What Influences Personnel Decisions? 
Percent agreeing that personnel decisions 
are based on … 
Overall Central Regional Local Bosses Staff 
Official, written rules 80.9 78.0 83.2 83.3 76.7 81.8 
Merit, professional experience, performance 65.5 63.1 63.8 82.1 76.7 63.2 
Level of education 80.8 79.6 79.5 90.3 88.4 79.4 
Seniority 76.2 77.2 71.8 90.0 83.7 74.8 
Family connections 19.4 17.3 24.1 9.7 7.3 21.7 
Regional connection 26.4 25.2 29.4 20.0 12.5 29.0 
Political connections (affiliation) 34.6 34.5 40.8 13.3 26.8 36.1 
Connections and patronage within the 
institution 
34.8 32.1 44.5 9.7 13.2 38.7 
Change of political administration of the 
institution 
39.8 45.1 42.3 10.3 29.3 42.0 
Based on unofficial payments 6.4 6.5 8.1 0.0 2.4 7.2 
 
Officials from local self-government generally report the lowest levels of non-meritocratic influences on 
personnel decisions, and regional governments the highest.  The survey responses also make clear that 
supervisors generally have a rosier view of personnel decision making, while ordinary staff are more likely 
to believe that connections or unofficial payments play a role. 
Although eight out of ten officials reported that personnel decisions are based on formal rules, and most 
believe the decisions are based on merit and qualifications, only six out of ten believe that the rules are 
transparent, and just over half report that decisions are audited.  Over 45 percent reported the lack of an 
appeals process. 
Table 74.  Quality of Personnel Decisions? 
Percent agreeing that personnel 
decisions are … 
Overall Central Regional Local Bosses Staff 
Transparent and clear 61.5 57.5 58.6 87.1 60.4 67.4 
Audited on a regular basis by internal 
control agencies 
54.1 46.2 61.4 53.3 52.2 63.9 
Accessible by other employees  58.0 58.8 50.9 82.8 55.6 69.8 
Subject to a workable appeals process 58.9 59.4 63.3 60.9 59.2 57.1 
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A recent cross-country study finds that the existence of a merit-based civil service is an important 
determinant of the level of corruption in the country.54  The survey results for Slovakia strongly support this 
conclusion.  Each of the individual dimensions of personnel policy quality and meritocracy listed in Tables 
63 and 64 is individually highly correlated with the level of corruption within the institution55; the existence 
of patronage and connections within the institutions, and the use of informal payments being the single 
largest contributors.56  An index of all of the factors, capturing the overall level of meritocracy, is also 
highly correlated with the level of corruption.57   The strength of this result confirms that anticorruption 
involves much more than putting bribe payers and bribe takers in jail – implementation of a merit-based 
civil service is also a key element of an anticorruption strategy.  (See Figure 33.) 
Figure 33.  Meritocracy and Corruption 
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Internal Channels of Communication 
 
Public officials generally responded positively when asked about the channels of communications within 
their organizations, although there were marked differences between the levels of government, with local 
self-governments reporting the most open channels of communications.  (See Table 75.)  Only half of the 
surveyed public officials agreed that managers take into account the opinions of subordinates when making 
decisions.  (Supervisory officials and staff were in agreement on this point.)  
                                                          
54 James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans, “Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed 
countries”, Journal of Public Economics 75, 2000.  49-71. 
55 The sole exception is the existence of an appeals process, which is not correlated with the level of corruption. 
56 In a regression of the level of corruption on the use of connections and patronage within the institution for making 
personnel decisions, the t-statistic of the slope coefficient was 7.1;  a similar regression with the use of unofficial 
payments on the right-hand side yields a slope estimate with a t-statistic of 6.2. 
57 When regressing the level of corruption the index of meritocracy (based on the variables in Tables 62 and 63), the 
coefficient on meritocracy is significant at the 0.01% level.  This result hold when organizational dummy variables are 
included.  Adjusted R-squared rises from 0.15 to 0.25 when organizational dummies are included, suggesting that there 
is both an effect between governmental bodies, and an effect within governmental bodies.  Probits were also run with 
whether or not the respondent had been offered a bribe in the previous two years as the dependent variable.  For offers 
of gifts, the coefficient on meritocracy was significant at the 1% level , whether or not organizational dummies were 
included; for offers of money, the coefficient was not significant. 
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Table 75.  Channels of Communication  
Percent Agreeing that … Overall Central Regional Local Bosses Staff 
Channels of information in the institution are 
sufficient 
66.2 55.6 72.9 80.6 66.7 66.1 
Those affected by decisions are informed first 79.7 70.9 84.7 93.5 81.4 79.4 
Managers take into account subordinate’s 
opinion when making decisions 
50.2 54.3 41.9 66.7 51.2 50.0 
I have access to information needed to work 
effectively 
76.5 70.3 78.2 93.5 79.1 76.0 
I am clear about the steps to solve the 
problems I face 
78.0 69.5 84.9 83.9 72.1 79.1 
 
The openness of channels of communication is negatively correlated with corruption – where the internal 
channels of communication are the greatest, the level of corruption is the least.  (See Figure 34.)  This 
result seems to hold both between governmental organizations (organizations that have the most open 
communications have the least corruption), and within organizations (people who view the lines of 
communications as open are less likely to believe that corruption is widespread in their organization).58 
Figure 34.  Information Flows and Corruption 
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58 When regressing the level of corruption an index of information openness (based on the variables in Table 75), the 
coefficient on information openness is significant at the 0.01% level.  This result hold when organizational dummy 
variables are included.  Adjusted R-squared rises from 0.12 to 0.27 when organizational dummies are included, 
suggesting that there is both an effect between governmental bodies, and an effect within governmental bodies.  Probits 
were also run with whether or not the respondent had been offered a bribe in the previous two years as the dependent 
variable.  For offers of gifts, the coefficient on information openness was significant at the 5% level (2% level when 
organizational dummies were included); for offers of money, the coefficient was not significant. 
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Freedom of Information 
 
At the heart of the political, economic and social changes that have come to be known as the “transition” is 
freedom and openness.  Most notably, political processes have been opened to multiple parties, fair 
elections and public debate.   The Free Information Access Act (FIAA), currently being discussed in 
Parliament, takes openness beyond the political process and into the workings of the government.  
Openness provides the electorate the information needed to evaluate the fairness, transparency, and 
efficiency of their government bodies, and holds promise as a means for encouraging public sector 
efficiency and limiting corruption.  A reform such as the FIAA, however, will only be effective if it is 
implemented – implementation may be undermined if there is strong resistance among the public sector 
officials entrusted with implementation.  With this concern in mind, the survey of public officials asked a 
series of question on support for openness in general, support for the FIAA in particular, and concerns that 
officials have about implementation of the FIAA. 
Table 76 highlights the diversity in the manner in which state bodies from all levels of government 
currently provide information to the public.  At all levels, respondents reported that information is provided 
on demand; local self-governments are much more likely to post information in public areas, and the 
central state administration is much more likely to put information on the internet.  Ninety-eight percent of 
all respondents said that information is provided to the public in at least some form, and 90 percent provide 
it in writing.  Among particular bodies, the courts stand out for relying on “information on demand” – none 
of the respondents from the courts reported that activity reports are issued. 
Table 76.  Current Means of Publishing Information  
(percentage of respondents 
indicating that their agencies 
publish information in this 
way) 
Overall Central Regional Local 
Via spokesman 42 65 37 23 
Activity reports 70 73 61 76 
Regional periodicals via the 
regional media 
62 55 71 58 
Posted in public areas 63 26 68 92 
Via the internet 28 60 19 5 
Information provided on 
demand (but publishing must 
be approved) 
86 82 76 99 
 
On an abstract level, most officials support the notions of open access to decision-making, and recognize 
the positive effect that transparency would have on decisions.  (See Table 77.)  Over 80 percent of officials 
believe decision making processes should be open, and nearly 90 percent believe that publishing decisions 
would force decision makers to follow more reasonable approaches.  Among the three levels of 
government, local self-governments were relatively more agreeable than the other levels to openness in 
decision making processes. 
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Table 77.  Support for Openness in Public Administration 
 Percentage responding: 
 Definitely 
Yes 
Rather 
Yes 
Rather 
No 
Definitely 
No 
“Would you agree if decision making 
sessions at all public administration levels 
would be freely accessible to the public, 
except confidential state issues?” 
49.1 34.4 11.4 2.8 
“Do you think that the names of members of 
decision-making commissions at all public 
administration levels should be published?” 
44.6 32.1 15.6 6.3 
“Do you think that the publishing of the 
decisions would force the deciding persons 
to follow a more reasonable approach?” 
55.4 32.7 6.8 2.8 
Row do not sum to 100 because some respondents answered “I don’t know” 
 
The survey of public officials asked officials whether they believed that the FIAA was necessary, and 80 
percent said that it is.59  Belief in the need for such an Act is highest among central government officials 
and lowest among officials of the regional bodies of the central government. 
Respondents were also asked to evaluate how complicated the FIAA would make their work.  By and large, 
respondents did not feel that an FIAA would greatly complicate their work.  Only 35 percent felt that the 
work of their institution would become more complicated, while 59 percent felt that such an act would 
probably not complicate their work.  Indeed, an official’s opinion on the need an FIAA and support of the 
reform is very highly correlated with the degree to which she feels the work of the institution would be 
more complicated as a result of the reform60.  Officials from the courts, customs and labor offices were 
least supportive of the need for FIAA reform; courts and customs were most concerned that the FIAA 
would complicate their work. 
Figure 35. “How complicated will the FIAA make your work?” 
Central
very
rather
rather 
not
not at all
don't 
know
Regional
very
rather
don't 
know
not at all
rather 
not
Local Self-Governm ent
rather
not at all
verydon't 
know
rather 
not
The survey responses provide reason for optimism regarding openness such as that proposed in the Free 
Information Access Act.  There is a good deal of support for the reforms among public officials.  Those that 
don’t support the reforms, and could ultimately undermine its effectiveness, are those that are concerned 
                                                          
59 After dropping responses of “I don’t know”, the percentage stating the need for the FIAA rises to 89 percent. 
60 Regressing support for reform on a variable indicating whether work would be made more complicated yields a t-
statistic of 6.7.  Similarly, probit regression of the need for reform on the same variable yields a p-value of 0.0001. 
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over the details of implementation.  Throughout this report, a consistent theme is that corruption stems in 
part from bureaucracy and inefficiency – while the FIAA may bring greater openness, lack of attention to 
the details of implementation could bring unnecessary bureaucracy and thereby reduce the effectiveness of 
this important reform. 
 
Decentralization 
 
A second major reform of the public sector is the current proposal of public administration reform, a key 
component of which is decentralization.  Specifically, many of the functions of the regional and district 
bodies of state administration would be devolved to an intermediate level of government that would be 
answerable directly to the people in the regions. The over-centralized state structures left behind by the 
communists have in many ways already been supplanted by decentralized decision making – competitive 
markets are highly decentralized relative to the socialist economic system.  The underlying theme of the 
market economy, making firms answerable to the people, is echoed in proposals for decentralization which 
intend to make government more responsive to the people. 
There are many reasons to favor decentralized government structures: being answerable to the people who 
use the services government provides will force the new regional self-governments to provide the mix of 
services that people prefer and to deliver high quality services.  In theory, being answerable to the people is 
also expected to have a positive effect on the level of corruption, since the electorate can remove politicians 
that do not ensure clean agencies.  
On first glance, the public official’s survey appears to support the notion that decentralization will help 
reduce corruption.  At every level of government, the officials themselves reported having greater faith in 
the honesty and integrity of local self-governments than of the central state or regional state administration.  
(See Table 78.)  Local self-governments also exhibit higher levels of some qualities of public 
administration discussed in this report: staff more closely identify with the organizational mission, are more 
likely to consider citizens to be their clients, follow more sound personnel policies, and have the most open 
channels of communication.  However, we have also seen that local self-governments are softer on bribe 
takers and are more likely to use discretion, rather than following clear rules.  More importantly, the 
competencies of the current self-governments are very limited relative to those envisioned by the new 
regional self-governments, and lower levels of corruption may simply reflect this fact. 
Table 78.  Faith in the Honesty and Integrity of Various Levels of Government  
 
5=much faith, 1=no faith 
Overall Opinions of 
Central 
Government 
Officials 
Opinions of 
Regional 
Government 
Officials 
Opinions of 
Local 
Government 
Officials 
Faith in the honesty and integrity of 
the Central government 
2.78 2.82 2.67 2.85 
Faith in the Honesty and integrity of 
Regional bodies of the central 
government 
2.82 2.79 2.88 2.78 
Faith in the honesty and integrity of 
Municipality 
3.40 3.03 3.15 4.05 
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Support for Reforms 
 
Even the most well-intentioned reforms can be undermined if they meet resistance from the public sector 
employees who must ultimately implement them and endure the consequences.  At the stage of designing 
the reforms, it is useful to have an understanding of the resistance that various reforms are likely to meet.  
Public officials were asked to evaluate how much they would support various types of reforms, and the 
results are presented in Table 79. 
The results are encouraging.  As a whole, public officials reported generally high levels of support for 
many kinds of public administration reforms.  The most popular reforms, from the public official’s 
perspective, are increasing transparency in political party funding, administrative simplification, and 
establishing a merit-based civil service.  The least popular reforms are the privatization of public services, 
administrative decentralization, setting performance targets and standards, and reducing public sector 
employment (with an increase in the salaries of those who remain).  While these reforms are less popular 
than the others included in the survey, the level of support is still high. With the exception of privatization 
of public services, each of these “less popular” reforms are supported by well over half of the public 
officials surveyed.61  Although this is a positive sign, optimism should be muted by remembering (as 
described in the section on Freedom of Information Act, below) that people may be supportive of broad 
concepts, yet cautious about the details.  
Public officials from the regional bodies are generally less supportive of reforms, and this is especially true 
regarding the proposal to shrink total public employment while increasing wages.  They are also much less 
supportive of administrative decentralization than either of the other two bodies.  Public officials from 
municipalities, by contrast, are much more supportive of decentralization and setting performance 
standards than officials at the other two levels of government.  The reforms that receives the most support 
from officials at the municipalities is administrative simplification. Given that bureaucracy is a major 
problem doing business and is closely linked with corruption, the combination of high support from public 
officials, and clearly demonstrated need for the reform, suggest that administrative simplification could be 
an important component of public administration reform. 
Public officials at higher ranks are generally more supportive of reforms than staff, the biggest difference 
being in the area of decentralization.  Supervisors and staff alike are highly supportive of administrative 
simplification. 
                                                          
61 Only 48 percent of respondents supported privatization of public services. 
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Table 79.  Resistance to Reforms  
1=totally agree with the reform; 4=totally 
disagree with the reform 
Overall Central Regional Local Bosses Staff 
Minimum number of observations 325 108 107 104 116 205 
A law that assures that the economic 
resources handled by the political parties will 
have their origins and destinations plainly 
identified 
1.30 1.20 1.34 1.36 1.32 1.28 
Administrative simplification 1.32 1.29 1.40 1.25 1.31 1.32 
Establishing a civil service career in which 
salary increases and promotions are 
specifically based on performance indicators 
1.54 1.45 1.61 1.58 1.49 1.57 
More devolution to operating management 1.64 1.63 1.75 1.54 1.64 1.64 
Rationalization of spending within the 
budget 
1.70 1.73 1.84 1.52 1.56 1.78 
Reducing the number of management levels 1.71 1.75 1.73 1.65 1.67 1.73 
A greater supervision of the general public 
and civil society over the activities of the 
public sector 
1.72 1.69 1.91 1.54 1.57 1.80 
A law that would give the citizen free access 
to all the information in the hands of the 
state, except classified information 
1.86 1.80 1.96 1.82 1.82 1.87 
Setting service performance targets and 
standards 
2.00 2.12 2.08 1.80 1.91 2.06 
Decrease of the number of public officials, if 
this would increase salaries and the other 
incomes of those officials (clerks) who kept 
their jobs 
2.07 1.86 2.45 1.88 1.95 2.14 
Administrative decentralization of the state, 
delegating operative functions of the national 
government to the municipalities 
2.10 2.15 2.34 1.82 1.87 2.23 
Privatization of public services 2.50 2.31 2.69 2.51 2.37 2.57 
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 6. Summary of Key Findings 
 
The surveys of households, enterprises, and public officials, have provided a wealth of information on 
perceptions and actual experiences with corruption in Slovakia.  Regarding the levels and trends: 
 Corruption is perceived to be widespread and especially problematic in health, justice, the National 
Property Fund, customs, police, and ministries.  The perceptions are buttressed by actual experiences – 
many enterprises and ordinary people reported paying bribes, and many public officials reported 
having been offered gifts or money by clients.  Of the fifty bodies and services reported on by 
households and enterprises, there were reports of bribery for every single one. 
 Corruption is more widespread than ten years ago, but the recent trends are less clear.  While there is 
some evidence that the corruption problem has improved somewhat compared to a few years ago, 
many believe that it is as bad today as ever.  Corruption remains a significant problem that must be 
addressed. 
The surveys help to highlight the sectors most affected, and the reasons the unofficial payments are made in 
these sectors: 
 The courts were identified by all three sample groups as slow and largely corrupt.  Slowness of courts 
and low executability of justice were identified by enterprises are severe problems doing business, and 
both households and enterprises reported that they frequently encounter bribery in their experiences 
with courts. 
 The health sector is perceived by all three sample groups as a sector with widespread corruption.  The 
survey of households confirmed this perception – pozornost was paid for hospital stays far more often 
than for any other public sector body or service about which households reported.  Despite the fact that 
some said their pozornost was paid voluntarily, the widespread perception that corruption is rife in the 
health sector suggests that even these “voluntary” payments are considered “corruption” by the 
population.  The lack of clear guidelines delineating acceptable tokens of appreciation from 
unacceptable bribes, adds to confusion and strengthens the perception of corruption. 
 Corruption in the educational system is centered mostly around universities.  Moreover, there is a 
widespread perception that one can not gain admittance to law or medical schools without paying 
bribes.  Reforms within the justice system and the health sector, both reported to have widespread 
corruption, should also address the educational institutions that produce the new cadres of 
professionals.  
 Several regulatory and licensing bodies are reported to be the frequent recipients of bribes:  import and 
export permits, construction permits, and other licenses, the Business Registry (run by the courts), 
Certification Authority, Customs, and State Business Supervision, all were reported by the enterprises 
that deal with them to be frequent recipients of bribes.  Reducing bureaucracy and administrative 
barriers, already part of the National Program, will be a key component of a strategy to reduce the 
levels of bribery among regulatory and licensing bodies. 
 Roughly one in nine enterprises said they sponsor political parties.  Most enterprises believe that it is a 
common practice, although a larger percentage believe it was common practice before the 1998 
elections.  Clarifying and making more transparent the interface between politicians and private 
enterprises should be a top priority.  Attempting to influence policy is natural and even useful – but 
when the influence comes through non-transparent sponsoring of parties, the result is often corruption.  
Indeed, enterprises that sponsor political parties were more likely than other enterprises to use political 
pressure as a means of getting state subsidies.  Although the component of the National Program on 
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“transparency in political life” may be contentious, the findings in this report suggest that it will be 
crucial for a sustained anticorruption effort. 
 Similarly, many enterprises reported paying bribes to receive state subsidies, and many more reported 
using political influence and connections with friends and relatives to get the subsidies.  Many firms 
that regularly sell to the state reported that firms like theirs routinely pay bribes to win contracts, and 
most enterprises that have participated in tenders believe that it is very difficult to win public sector 
tenders without paying bribes.  
 Rewarding cronies with favorable, non-transparent, privatization decisions can be more pernicious 
than other forms of corruption, since it tends to institutionalize corruption.  There is a perception that 
corruption is widespread at the National Property Fund, a perception also held by the subset of 
privatized enterprises.   
In many ways, identifying the problem of corruption is easier than identifying its source or its solution.  
The public officials survey helps to provide guidance on the weaknesses that lead to corruption, and some 
reforms that may help prevent corruption.  
 The surveys show clearly that corruption is associated with bureaucracy, with firms and households 
paying bribes to speed the processes along.  Public sector institutions at which employees report that 
rules hinder their ability to deliver services in a timely manner have more widespread corruption 
problems.  Public administration reforms that increase efficiency and decrease bureaucratic delays will 
help to reduce corruption.  The use of client surveys by the organizations themselves can help to 
highlight weaknesses and suggest areas for improvement in organizational performance.  
 The lack of clear guidelines for the acceptance of gifts leaves officials with no guidance for acceptable 
behaviors.  A Code of Ethics, of the sort envisioned in the National Program, will help to clarify this 
important issue.  Similarly, administrative procedures for disciplining staff can serve an important 
purpose as a deterrent – many public officials did not know how bribe takers are punished. 
 Corruption is significantly influenced by many factors that characterize the administration of the public 
sector:   
 the clarity of information flows within the organization 
 identification of staff with the organization’s objectives and strategies 
 the quality of internal administration, and the implementation of clear, unambiguous, 
predefined procedures of internal administration 
 the level of meritocracy and the quality of personnel policies 
 Among these factors, each of which are related to each other, the existence of 
meritocracy and the quality of internal administration exhibit the strongest relationship 
with the level of corruption.62  
 While local self-governments do seem to have less widespread corruption problems than bodies of 
state administration, it is not clear that decentralization will help to reduce corruption, since the 
competencies of the local self-governments are few compared to the proposed competencies of the 
regional self-governments.  Well planned implementation of the new Concept of Public Administration 
will be the key to ensuring the benefits of a decentralized state, without allowing corruption to fill the 
vacuums that emerge during the decentralization process. 
 Most officials understand the need for openness of the sort envisioned in the draft Free Information 
Access Act and support the concept of open, transparent, decision making.  Those that are most 
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62 In a regression with the level of corruption as the dependent variable, and indices of each of the four dimensions 
outlined in the text, only meritocracy and the quality of internal administration remained significant at the 5% level. 
concerned about the law are the ones who believe it will complicate the work of their institutions.  As 
bureaucracy and slow service delivery have been identified as contributors to corruption, the 
implementation of the Free Information Access Act should be undertaken with care not to 
unnecessarily complicate the work of the employees that must administer it. 
 Public officials were broadly supportive of a number of public sector reforms.  They were most 
supportive of transparency in political party financing, administrative simplification, and establishment 
of a merit-based civil service.  As bureaucracy and non-merit personnel policies were identified to be 
closely correlated with corruption, measures to simplify administrative procedures and establish a 
merit-based civil service should be high on the public sector agenda.  Likewise, the unambiguous 
benefits of transparency in party financing, and the strong support among officials, highlight the 
importance of reforms in this area.  
 The survey responses exhibit a high degree of acceptance of corruption.  Many officials said they 
would not turn in colleagues they knew to be taking bribes, and both households and enterprises that 
paid bribes usually said that the bribe was not explicitly required by the official but assumed to be 
necessary.  Many seem resigned to a deepening of corruption:  only one in nine Slovaks believe that 
corruption will abate in the next three years, while one in three thinks it will get worse.  When the 
survey was administered in the fall of 1999, 48 percent of the population felt that the Government was 
not serious about solving the corruption problem, and 60 percent felt likewise about the National 
Council.  These facts add impetus to the Education component of the National Program, which seeks 
to educate the public about the problem of corruption and what they can do about it.  One notable 
success story in the fight against corruption, Hong Kong, also used surveys to highlight problems and 
also successfully employed a public education campaign to reduce tolerance for the practice. 
Since the summer of 1999, momentum for anticorruption has grown steadily with the establishment of the 
Anticorruption Steering Committee led by the Deputy Prime Minister, development and public 
dissemination of the National Program for the Fight Against Corruption, and public statements by the 
Prime Minister that anticorruption is a top priority of the Government.  Maintaining this momentum by 
developing an action plan with a clear timetable for delivery can help to regain the public’s trust, keeping 
Slovakia on track of rebuilding an efficient, transparent, open public sector that serves the citizenry and 
business sector, rather than the other way around. 
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 Annex 1. Detailed Sample Characteristics 
Household Sample 
 
SEX %  
Male 47.9 
Female 52.0 
 
AGE % 
18 – 24  16.5 
25 – 34 19.2 
35 – 44 20.6 
45 – 54 16.8 
55 – 59 6.1 
More than 60 20.6 
 
EDUCATION % 
Elementary 35.2 
Vocational 30.0 
Secondary 26.4 
University 8.3 
 
NATIONALITY % 
Slovak 85.7 
Hungarian 10.6 
Other 3.6 
 
SIZE OF COMMUNITY  % 
Less than 2 000 inhabitants  30.4 
2 – 5 000 inhabitants  13.1 
5 – 20 000 inhabitants  14.9 
20 – 50 000 inhabitants  16.4 
50 – 100 000 inhabitants  12.1 
Bratislava, Košice  12.9 
 
REGION  % 
Bratislava  11.5 
Trnava  10.2 
Trenčín  11.3 
Nitra  13.3 
Žilina  12.8 
Banská Bystrica  12.3 
Prešov  14.4 
Košice  14.1 
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 Enterprise Sample 
 
LEGAL FORM % 
Shareholding 26.5 
Limited 34.2 
Entrepreneur 34.9 
other 4.4 
 
SECTOR % 
Agriculture/Forestry 7.9 
Mining 0.5 
Industry/Energy 13.5 
Construction 15.7 
Wholesalers/Retailers 28.0 
Hotel/Restaurant 2.2 
Banking 1.7 
Health/Education/Culture 3.7 
Other Services  26.8 
OWNERSHIP % 
State 2.5 
Municipal 0.2 
Cooperative 2.0 
Private 92.4 
Mixed 2.9 
 
EMPLOYEES % 
1-10 59 
11-30 17 
31-100 8 
101-200 5 
>200 5 
 
REGION % 
Bratislava 26.3 
Trnava 8.1 
Trencín 8.6 
Nitra 16.2 
Žilina 12.5 
Banská Bystrica 10.1 
Prešov 7.6 
Košice 10.6 
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 Public Official Sample 
 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT  % 
Central State Administration  33.5 
Regional and District Offices  34.1 
Local Self-Government  32.4 
 
REGION % 
Bratislava 34.7 
Trnava 5.4 
Trencín 6.5 
Nitra 8.8 
Žilina 7.4 
Banská Bystrica 13.9 
Prešov 12.8 
Košice 10.5 
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Annex 2. Definitions for “At a Glance” Tables  
 
Household “At a Glance” Tables 
CONTACT The percentage of households with contact in the previous two 
years 
NO. VISITS Average number of visits necessary to settle the matter 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS Percentage of households needing to visit other institutions to 
settle the matter 
POZORNOST Of those with contact, the percentage that paid some pozornost 
-  NECESSARY Of those that paid pozornost, the percentage who felt it was 
necessary.  I.e., responses of “nobody required it, but I know this 
is the way it goes,” or “the institution workers required it.” 
SATISFACTION WITH BEHAVIOR Percentage of households giving a favorable satisfaction rating for 
the behavior of officials 
OVERALL SATISFACTION Percentage of households giving a favorable satisfaction rating for 
overall service quality 
 
 
 
Enterprise “At a Glance” Tables 
CONTACT Percentage of firms with contact in the previous twelve months 
FIRMS ENCOUNTERING 
BRIBERY 
Of those with contact, the percentage encountering bribery 
VISITS ENCOUNTERING 
BRIBERY 
Average percentage of visits in which bribery was encountered.  
This is calculated as the percentage of visits for each enterprise 
and then averaged across all enterprises.  This is not the same 
variable as that presented in Figure 6, which equals the total 
number of visits at which a bribe was indicated, divided by the 
total number of visits 
BRIBE SIZE Average size of the bribe, among those who encountered bribery 
RATING OF QUALITY Percentage of enterprises giving a favorable quality rating 
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